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Abstract 
 
Theories of hegemonic stability and power transition largely neglect the role of weaker 
third parties in sustaining hegemony or producing systemic change. This study develops a 
three actor game theoretic model of power transition and hegemony, in which a declining 
hegemon and a rising challenger compete for the loyalty of a third state. It finds the threat 
of preventive war can deter challenges to a hegemon’s portfolio of subordinate states, 
providing an alternative explanation for both hegemonic longevity and systemic war. The 
model’s theoretical findings are illustrated and evaluated against Britain’s relative decline 
vis-à-vis the United States and Germany in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
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Introduction and Theoretical Foundations 
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A Contemporary Case Study: Thailand between the United States and China 
The Kingdom of Thailand has a long history as an independent polity, but it has 
long been vulnerable to interference by foreign powers. Thailand was the only 
independent state in Southeast Asia at the end of the Second World War. Its former 
patrons were weak and the international security environment was fluid. As Cold War 
alliance blocs solidified and competition spread to Southeast Asia, Thailand chose to 
align its foreign policy with that of the United States, entering into a security relationship 
that has lasted to this day (Nuechterlein 1965). 
 The relationship was formalized first in the formation of the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and later in the 1962 Thanat-Rusk communiqué, 
which pledged the United States to defend Thailand’s independence and territorial 
integrity. Thailand has been among the strongest supporters of U.S. military interventions 
abroad, providing significant assistance in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq (1991), Afghanistan and 
Iraq (2003). In return, the United States has provided military training and weapons, law 
enforcement training, and economic assistance. The United States has also been a major 
market and source of investment for Thailand. The United States designated Thailand a 
major non-NATO ally (MNNA) in 2003, and Thailand has remained a committed 
member of the U.S. “hub and spoke” alliance system in Asia.1 It has also fostered 
increasingly close ties with China over the last two decades. Concurrently, U.S. 
                                                 
1 Congressional Research Service. Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations. (RL32593; June 5, 2012), by 
Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ben Dolven. For a discussion of the hub and spoke system, see Victor D. Cha. 
2009. “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia.” International Security 334 (3): 158-196. 
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policymakers have fretted over a rapidly-growing China’s foreign policy intentions and 
military capabilities.2  
Sino-Thai hostility persisted through much of the Cold War. After decades of 
slow rapprochement, China’s response to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis signified a new 
era in China’s relations with Thailand and Southeast Asia broadly (Ba 2008). The crisis 
began with the collapse of the Thai baht but quickly spread across the region, resulting in 
severe economic contraction exacerbated by competitive currency devaluations. China, 
however, abstained from such devaluations, offered standby loans through the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and initiated a $1.2 trillion infrastructure investment 
program, privileging domestic spending over exports.3 Thailand’s people were strongly 
supportive of China’s response and looked unfavorably on that of the United States, 
which was seen as exerting pressure through the IMF to implement austerity measures 
without making sufficient contributions to rescue packages.4 
Since then, Sino-Thai relations have continued to improve. A China-Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area went into effect in 2010, and 
China is on pace to become Thailand’s largest trading partner in the coming years.5 China 
has provided substantial military aid and training to Thailand, and Thailand ranks among 
the top ten recipients of China’s foreign aid and government-sponsored investment.6 
                                                 
2 For one example, see Julian E. Barnes, Nathan Hodge, and Jeremy Page. “China Takes Aim at U.S. Naval 
Might.” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2012. 
3 Congressional Research Service, China’s Response to the Asian Financial Crisis: Implications for U.S. 
Economic Interests. (98-220 E, March 3, 1999), by Wayne M. Morrison, accessed through wikileaks.org. 2. 
4 Congressional Research Service, Asian Financial Crisis and Recovery: Status and Implications for U.S. 
Interests. (RL30517; April 6, 2012), by Richard P. Cronin, accessed through wikileaks.org. 14. 
5 Toh Han Shih, “China gaining on top Thai trade spot,” South China Morning Post, February 27, 2013. 
6 See Charles Wolf Jr., Xiao Wang, and Eric Warner. 2013. China’s Foreign Aid and Government-
Sponsored Investment Activities. Washington: RAND Corporation and Congressional Research Service, 
China’s ‘Soft Power’ in Southeast Asia. (RL34310; January 4, 2008), by Thomas Lum, Wayne M. 
Morrison, and Bruce Vaughn. 8. 
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 Thailand’s relationship with China mirrors that of many other developing 
countries both in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. The international economic ties fostered 
by China’s appetite for raw materials and growing willingness to invest outside of its 
borders have led to a commensurate deepening of political ties. But while these states are 
drawn to the economic opportunities that come from relations with China, many have 
preserved or deepened their security relationship with the United States. Thailand is one 
such case. Some analysts argue Southeast Asian states in particular fear that should the 
United States withdraw from the region, China will not continue to respect their 
autonomy and deliver public goods (Ba 2008). As a coping strategy, many of these states 
have attempted to deepen the U.S. commitment to the region, while maintaining strong 
ties with China. 
U.S. and Chinese officials emphasize prospects for cooperation in the bilateral 
relationship.7 With the exception of North Korea, no state in the region has had to forfeit 
relations with one power in order to preserve relations with the other. But despite this 
situation, the United States has taken concrete steps to strengthen its alliances with states 
near China’s borders and China has consistently claimed these actions constitute a 
strategy of containment.8 Are these strategies compatible? Will U.S. allies remain loyal 
as they become more dependent on China? How will the latent competition over allies 
and clients impact the ongoing power transition between the United States and China? 
 This study seeks answers to these questions. Since A.F.K. Organzski (1958) 
introduced power transition theory, changes in the distribution of power among the 
                                                 
7 For an influential U.S. perspective, see Robert B. Zoellick. 2005. “Whither China: From Membership to 
Responsibility?” Remarks to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. For a Chinese perspective, 
see Zheng Bijian. 2005. “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status,” Foreign Affairs 84 (5): 18-24. 
8 Jane Perlez. “Warm Words From China, With a Subtext of Warning.” New York Times. November 7, 
2012. 
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leading powers in the international system have been accepted as a source of systemic 
change in world politics. Largely absent from this otherwise well-developed literature is 
an examination of how declining and rising powers utilize third parties in pursuit of their 
strategic goals, and how these third parties choose to align their foreign policies. Here, I 
develop and illustrate a theory of power transition and hegemony that seeks to explain 
how potential shifts in international political alignment impact the likelihood of conflict 
in a power transition setting, and how the power transition influences the strategic 
calculus of a third party. 
Theoretical Foundations 
 The distribution of economic and military power among states in the international 
system has almost always been unequal.9 Even among the major powers in the system, 
equal distributions of power have rarely been witnessed (Nye 1990, 185). These power 
inequalities stem from differences in regime type, resource endowments, population, and 
other factors that provide the foundation for the development of military, economic, and 
other types of international power. 
 The international system is often described as anarchic, but these power 
inequalities serve as the necessary preconditions for the development of hierarchical 
relations among states. States frequently order themselves into international hierarchies 
that explicitly or implicitly set rules for interactions among the group (Lake 2007). 
Further, these hierarchies often take on properties of domestic governments. A leading 
                                                 
9 This discussion and the game theoretic model that follows abstract away from consideration of the 
relative utility of different types of power (military, economic, cultural, etc). Power is defined simply as the 
ability to compel others to do something they otherwise wouldn’t do (Dahl 1957).  
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state provides public goods to subordinate states within the hierarchy in exchange for 
compliance and support (Lake 2009).10 
The leaders of these hierarchies are hegemons. Gilpin (1981, 145) defines a 
hegemon as a state that “supplies public goods (security and protection of property rights) 
in exchange for revenue.” Gilpin’s definition is useful in that it describes the behavior, 
rather than the characteristics of a hegemon. Therefore, a hegemon need not be the most 
powerful or wealthy state in a given system. I adopt Gilpin’s conception of hegemony 
with two modifications. 
First, I argue that hegemony best describes the nature of bilateral relationship 
between a dominant and subordinate state, rather than a systemic condition. In these 
relationships, the subordinate state sacrifices some foreign policy autonomy in exchange 
for benefits from the hegemon. This allows for both partial hegemonies and partial 
hegemonic transitions, as hegemony is divisible at the state level. 
Second, Snidal (1979) argues most states or international organizations and states 
can both exclude others from consuming and compel others to pay for many goods 
considered public. He calls goods that have these characteristics “quasi-public goods.” I 
adopt the phraseology “club goods” to refer to goods that are excludable but non-rival. 
The provider of a club good can exclude others from consumption of the good, but one 
state’s consumption does not impair the ability of others to consume it. If most 
international goods are of this type, then hegemons provide club goods to their 
subordinates in exchange for revenue. This study focuses on challenges to the 
                                                 
10 International public goods include “pressures for low tariffs, acceptance of nondiscrimination, and 
provision of stable monetary relations,” among others (Snidal 1985). 
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hegemonies of the dominant state in the international system, the state that possesses 
preponderant economic and military capabilities.  
These characteristics provide dominant states with both the incentive and the 
capacity to carry out hegemonic activities. Dominant states usually benefit 
disproportionately from club goods provision due to their large markets and economic 
centrality within a given hierarchy. Therefore, they may have an incentive to provide 
such goods, whether or not others contribute to its production (Olson 1965, 49-50).11 But 
even if subordinate states have incentives to free ride on the dominant state’s provision of 
these goods, the dominant state’s power allows it to coerce others to contribute (Gilpin 
1982). Krasner (1976), analyzing the relationship between power and trade, argues a 
potential hegemon has “symbolic, economic, and military capabilities that can be used to 
entice or compel others to accept an open trading structure.” 
The international system is not always organized hierarchically. Uniform 
distributions of power among the major actors in the system usually prevent any one state 
from establishing dominance over all others. However, in these more anarchical 
international orders, major powers may organize competing hierarchies, subordinating 
weaker states in the system. More frequently, an international hierarchy exists alongside 
local hierarchies, which are led by subordinate states of the larger international hierarchy 
(Lemke 2002). 
Because war is costly, states bargain and reach political settlements that reflect 
the distribution of power without war, barring incomplete information or commitment 
problems (Fearon 1995). If the power distribution in the international system is 
unchanging and this distribution is common knowledge, these hierarchies are 
                                                 
11 Olson refers to this type of actor as a “privileged” group. 
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theoretically stable. Subordinate states have no incentive to challenge the leader, and 
competing hierarchies have little incentive to challenge one another.  
The distribution of power in the international system is not unchanging, though. 
States grow economically and develop their militaries at differing rates. The industrial 
revolution’s uneven diffusion reinforced this phenomenon (Organski 1958). Other 
uneven economic and political shocks of various types can also cause states’ growth and 
power trajectories to diverge. Regardless of their source, varying economic growth rates 
consistently alter the international power distribution. 
These shifts create fluidity in the political arrangements governing international 
hierarchies. As their relative power grows, states may demand revisions to these 
arrangements or go to war in order to compel these revisions. The position of the 
dominant state itself may be challenged as a result of these shifts if another state’s power 
approaches and threatens to surpass its own. This situation puts both the declining 
hegemon and the rising challenger in a strategic dilemma, particularly when the future 
power of the challenger is unknown to the hegemon (Powell 1996b). The hegemon must 
either acquiesce to the accumulating demands of the challenger or fight a costly 
preventive war from its position of dominance. To complicate the strategic problem, the 
hegemon’s chances of winning this war decrease as the transition proceeds. The 
challenger must tailor its demands such that it yields concessions without provoking this 
preventive war early in the transition. 
Since Organski (1958), dozens of scholars have studied, evaluated, and 
reformulated his power transition theory.12 Most choice theoretic formulations of the 
theory and empirical evaluations of its hypotheses focus on dyadic settings, or assume a 
                                                 
12 A review of this literature follows this section. 
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state’s portfolio of subordinates is fixed. States are either satisfied or dissatisfied with 
regards to the international status quo and align themselves accordingly. They cannot 
jump from one group to another (Kugler and Lemke 1996). These assumptions reduce the 
need to develop theories that account for the behavior of third parties.13 Dyadic analyses 
with slight modifications can capture their possible impact. 
Are these assumptions valid? Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) posit a domestic 
model of politics in which competitors for leadership propose allocations of public and 
private goods in order to attract the support of those necessary to maintain power. If 
leadership (hegemony) in the international system is valuable and third party support is 
necessary to sustain hegemony, we can reasonably expect states that have the capacity to 
lead will likewise have an incentive to compete for the support of third parties in the 
pursuit of hegemony.14 As a state’s capacity to produce club goods increases, its ability to 
attract these third parties should also increase, as should the desirability of hegemony. As 
this state’s capacity to produce these goods approaches that of the hegemon, it may 
attempt to convince supporters of the hegemon to defect through promises of higher 
quantities of benefits. A third party must then choose to align with the hegemon or the 
challenger, if it wants to enjoy the provision club goods.15 If the hegemon and challenger 
differ only in their proposed provision of club goods, then a third party’s satisfaction is 
                                                 
13 This work assumes that “third parties” are always weaker than the declining dominant state. It also 
assumes, following the logic of Lemke (2002), that the rising and declining state are competing to be the 
most powerful actor in the system.	  
14 Kindleberger (1981, 248) notes providers of international public goods sometimes accrue private 
benefits. “Management of the gold-exchange standard by Britain from 1870 to 1913 and by the United 
States from 1945 to 1971 can be viewed as provision of either the public good of international money, or 
the private good for itself of seignorage, which is the profit that comes to the seigneur, or sovereign power, 
from the issuance of money.”	  
15 This assertion relies on the relatively strong assumption that consuming the club goods provided by a 
hegemon precludes consumption of goods provided by the challenger and vice versa. As the example of 
Thailand demonstrates, this need not be the case. This assumption is made to simplify analysis and the 
structure of the model presented later in this study. 
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endogenous to this model of international politics. A satisfied state is one that has 
maximized its quantity of club goods, given a set of provisions from which to choose. 
This study examines how a hegemon and a challenger compete for the loyalty of a 
third party and how that third party responds. The above provides theoretical context for 
the development of a formal model of power transition and hegemony, expounded upon 
in section three. The next section provides a review of the literature on hegemonic 
stability, power transition, and alliance formation. Section four analyzes the model put 
forth in section three, and section five examines historical cases of power transition, 
comparing their outcome to the expectations of the model. Section six concludes. 
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 In attempting to explain the impact of third parties in power transitions, I build 
upon three large and well-developed bodies of scholarship—theories of hegemonic 
stability, theories of power transition, and theories of alliance formation and maintenance. 
This section reviews these bodies of literature in order to highlight unresolved questions 
and preview this work’s contribution. Theories of hegemonic stability and theories of 
power transition provide complementary approaches to questions of systemic stability 
and change. Theories of hegemonic stability purport to explain why relative peace and 
the provision or global public goods correlate with the presence of a dominant economic 
power. Power transition theory attempts to explain under what conditions challenges to 
these hegemonic orders result in general war. Because this study is focused on the role of 
third parties in these processes, I also review some literature on alliance formation to 
explain why states form and maintain security ties with one another. 
Hegemonic Stability 
 Hegemonic stability theory (HST) provides a structural explanation to a long-
standing puzzle in international relations. If the international system is anarchic, why do 
some states nonetheless choose to carry out functions of global governance, providing 
international security, enforcing a system of free trade, and stabilizing monetary relations 
between states? HST’s adherents provide a simple explanation. They argue order in 
international relations is provided by a dominant state, which has a unique combination 
of the capacity to enforce rules and the incentive to create them. By the logic of HST, 
anarchy is not a perpetual condition of international politics, but instead the result of an 
absence of this dominant state. 
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 Kindleberger (1973), Krasner (1976), Modelski (1978) and Gilpin (1981) provide 
alternative definitions of a hegemon and differing causal mechanisms to explain 
hegemonic stability, but agree on its fundamental conclusion—that a hegemonic power 
provides stability and order to an otherwise anarchic international system. Their shared 
logic is (roughly) as follows. Public goods provision in international relations often takes 
the form of a prisoner’s dilemma. States prefer outcomes in which all cooperate to 
provide the good. If no individual state is necessary to provide the good, however, each 
state prefers to free ride off of the contribution of others, rather than contributing to the 
good themselves. The result of this setting is a collective action problem. No state 
contributes to the production of the good and it is not produced. 
 In hegemonic settings, this logic need not hold. Hegemons, because of their 
disproportionate size, have an incentive to see that a public good is provided, even if they 
must bear the entire cost of its production. This incentive leads hegemons to establish and 
maintain international regimes, or “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge” (Krasner 
1982, 186). Moreover, Krasner and Gilpin argue the hegemon’s capabilities allow it to 
compel others to contribute to the production of the good, even if they would otherwise 
prefer to free ride. Kindleberger’s argument relies primarily on the incentive to provide 
public goods, while Krasner and Gilpin focus on the hegemon’s ability to compel others 
to accept its international regimes (Krasner and Webb 1989, 184). HST’s original 
adherents provide differing explanations as to how a hegemon goes about compelling 
weaker states to support the system. Krasner argues the hegemon can use military means 
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to coerce weaker states, but that economic levers such as market access are generally 
more effective. 
 Hegemonic decline is a less-explored topic of HST, but these adherents seem to 
be in agreement that hegemony is a necessary condition to sustain international regimes. 
As hegemony erodes, the relative costs to the hegemon of providing international regimes 
increases, leading the hegemon to seek increasingly large payments from the consumers 
of its public goods. Concurrently, its capacity to extract these payments declines as its 
relative power decreases. These complementary pressures inevitably result in the 
deterioration of international regimes, or the replacement of the hegemon’s system with 
that of a rising challenger. 
 Empirical discrepancies motivated many of the critiques of HST that followed its 
initial presentation. Lake (1984), Conybeare (1984) and Snidal (1985) all argue that 
hegemony is not a necessary condition to sustain international regimes. Their theoretical 
objections to HST broadly fall into three categories (Gowa 1989). First, international 
trade theory holds hegemons should prefer a minimum tariff to a completely open trading 
structure. Second, small groups of states that together constitute a large portion of the 
international economy may be able to overcome collective action problems as effectively 
as a hegemon. Third, many of the public goods cited by HST aren’t public at all. They 
have both excludable and rivalrous characteristics. 
 Keohane (1984) synthesizes these arguments and concludes collective action can 
persist after hegemonic decline. Keohane argues the demand for international regimes 
created by a hegemon will persist after the hegemon’s decline. Additionally, these 
regimes help to ameliorate the collective action problems that may otherwise prevent 
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states for realizing cooperative outcomes. Thus, the legacy of hegemony continues to 
provide ordering principles for the international political economy and helps to facilitate 
cooperation in a non-hegemonic world. 
 Critics of these arguments believe their objections are overstated and the security 
implications of cooperative strategies are underexamined (Gowa 1989; Webb and 
Krasner 1989). Because state power influences bargaining outcomes, states must concern 
themselves with the distributional implications of cooperation (Powell 1991). Gowa 
highlights a key omission of many accounts of HST and criticisms of the theory. 
Keohane (1984, 41) acknowledges his analysis is aimed at explaining relations between 
members of the U.S. hegemonic system during the Cold War, the many of which were 
U.S. treaty allies. His account largely ignores the potential impact Soviet Union’s 
competing hegemony that existed alongside that of the United States during the Cold 
War. While this analysis gained explanatory power in the post Cold War unipolar world, 
it may not be sufficient to fully capture the strategic dynamics of other international 
power structures. In focusing on the competitive aspects of hegemony, this study attempts 
to fill that void. 
Power Transition Theory 
Power transitions theorists accept the basic tenets of hegemonic stability theory. 
Like hegemonic stability theory, power transition theory (PTT) is a structural theory that 
employs the distribution of power in the international system as its primary explanatory 
variable. However, PTT’s focus is on the strategic dynamics of hegemonic decline, 
particularly settings in which the hegemon’s decline is accompanied by the rise of a new 
prospective hegemon. Where hegemonic stability theorists are interested primarily in the 
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characteristics of power-preponderant systems, power transition theorists are interested in 
changes to power-preponderant systems. 
The theory seeks an explanation for when these changes result in general wars, 
those that involve the largest actors in a system engaged in conflict over governance of 
that system (Levy 1985, 344). Organski (1958) focuses on the distribution of power and a 
challenger’s satisfaction with the system in his original theory. In contrast to balance of 
power theorists, Organski argues power-preponderant systems are generally stable, while 
those in which power is evenly distributed are relatively unstable and prone to war. 
Moreover, after the industrial revolution, states grew at varying rates, providing impetus 
for rapid change in these distributions. The result is frequent power transitions, periods in 
which power preponderant systems shift to power parity systems. This transition, 
Organski argues, is a necessary condition for general war. Organski acknowledges, 
however, that not all transitions result in these wars. To explain this variance, Organski 
relies on the level of satisfaction of the challenging state. If a rising power is satisfied 
with the international status quo, the power transition can occur peacefully. Conversely, 
if the challenger is dissatisfied, there is a high likelihood of war. 
Since Organski, other scholars have focused on clarifying and expounding upon 
the nuances of the theory and testing it empirically. Empirical work has provided some 
support for Organski’s original formulation. Organski and Kugler (1980) conducted the 
original tests for the theory, finding that in the industrial era, a transition was indeed a 
necessary condition for general war, and that wars occurred in roughly half of the 
transitions studied. Other work has corroborated Organski and Kugler’s general findings, 
albeit with modifications to their assumptions and research design (Houweling and 
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Siccama 1988; Kim 1992; De Soysa, Oneal and Park 1997). In contrast, Mansfield (1992) 
finds that both highly concentrated distributions of power and highly equal distributions 
of power were correlated with peace, providing support for both PTT and its rival balance 
of power theory. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1988) find no evidence that the 
international distribution of power is directly linked to general war. 
This mixed empirical record has sparked further theoretical refinements of 
Organski’s theory. Lemke’s (2002) multiple hierarchy model accepts Organski’s core 
propositions, but instead posits a system composed of regional hierarchies nested inside a 
larger international hierarchy. Regional hierarchies are similar in form to the international 
hierarchy in which leading state sets rules and norms for subordinate states. These sub-
hierarchies are liable to outside interference, however, muting some of power transition 
theory’s explanatory power for intra-regional hierarchy relations. Lemke finds PTT 
predicts well outcomes in the international hierarchy, but that regional relations are more 
variable. He explains this variance as a product of differing degrees of great power 
interference in different regional hierarchies.   
Other scholars have formally modeled Organski’s power transition setting using 
dyadic bargaining models. Kim and Morrow (1992) use a simple timing game in which a 
rising state challenges the status quo, and a declining state must make concessions or 
fight in each round. Their model verifies some of Organski’s assertions, but finds a power 
transition itself is not analytically special. Shifts in power of any type can provide 
impetus for war. Powell (1996b) specifies a similar model, but endogenizes bargaining 
such that concessions from the declining state are assumed to occur along with shifts in 
power, assuming neither side initiates war. In Powell’s incomplete information model, 
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uncertainty over the extent of the rising state’s demands causes the declining state to 
adopt a strategy of minimal appeasement. It accepts risk that it will fight from a position 
of greater weakness in order to probabilistically avoid war. 
Kim (1991) revises Organski’s assumption that states do not often use alliances as 
a means of augmenting their power. He argues states use both internal and external 
means to increase their power and that states consider the power of both a prospective 
opponent and its allies when making war decisions. He tests this theory and finds that 
PTT’s core tenets hold, even when a state’s power is calculated along with that of its 
allies. Kim’s analysis is somewhat static, however. While he makes an important revision 
to Organski’s argument, he does not put forth a theoretical argument concerning how 
states engaged in a power transition form and maintain alliances. He proves alliances 
matter in power transition settings, but fails to specify exactly how. 
Third Parties and Hegemony 
 This thesis aims to develop the theoretical framework neglected in Kim’s work. In 
incorporating third parties into the analysis, it is important to understand the ways in 
which states form and maintain strategic relationships with one another. The literature on 
alliances and other types of lesser interstate relationships is vast. This section provides a 
limited survey of work relevant to the strategic setting modeled in this study. 
 After the Second World War, the United States formalized bilateral and 
multilateral alliances with other states around the world, pledging itself to defend others 
from external threats. The United States has also maintained varying degrees of less-
formalized security relations with other states. Regardless of their specific form, these 
agreements all take on characteristics of contracts, or “instruments through which to 
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control the behavior of others” (Lake 1996).  The model developed in the next section 
assumes these sorts of contracts are mutually exclusive—forming one with the challenger 
means one must abrogate a relationship with the hegemon. Adopting this broad definition 
surely invalidates this assumption. Thailand has maintained its formal alliance with the 
United States even as its relationship with China has become increasingly 
institutionalized. Nevertheless, this definition captures the wide variety of political 
arrangements that can govern relations between a hegemon and its subordinates. 
 Scholars have adopted two broad approaches to explaining the origins, purpose, 
and longevity of alliances: transactional approaches and public goods approaches. 
Transactional approaches follow Lake’s logic that alliances can be thought of as contracts 
specifying expected behavior. Neorealist accounts of capability aggregation (Walt 1985) 
loosely follow the transactional approach. States with interests in combating a common 
threat formalize this commonality through the signing of an alliance, specifying their 
expectations of the ally in a crisis. These accounts lack a focus on both the peacetime 
character of alliances and the tradeoffs involved in their formation. Altfeld (1984) posits 
a model of alliance formation in which states seek to maximize security, wealth, and 
autonomy. States can increase security through arms buildups or alliances, which come at 
the cost of wealth and autonomy respectively. A state’s proclivity to form alliances is 
thus based on that state’s valuation of security, wealth, and autonomy. Morrow (1991) 
develops a similar model, but specifies states’ preferences based on their power. He also 
modifies Altfeld’s assumption that alliances always come at the cost of foreign policy 
autonomy. Powerful states, by Morrow’s logic can use alliances to pursue policy 
objectives, increasing their autonomy. Weak states accept limits on their foreign policy 
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autonomy in exchange for security benefits. These different but complementary interests 
provide a basis for trade in security and autonomy between powerful and weak states. 
The result is “asymmetric alliances” that Morrow finds are more stable than alliances 
between states of equal strength. 
 Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) provide the theoretical foundations for the public 
goods approach to alliances. The public goods approach posits alliances are means by 
which states coordinate the production of international public goods—specifically, 
defense or deterrence. Olson and Zeckhauser examine NATO’s production of defense as 
a public good, and find alliances with large memberships produce suboptimal amounts of 
public goods and distribute burdens inequitably. This is due in large part to the 
characteristics of the good in question. Because public goods are nonrival and 
nonexcludable, states struggle to form mechanisms to compel others to contribute to their 
production. Others contest the characterization of defense as a pure public good (Sandler 
1993). Excepting pure nuclear deterrence, defense has rivalrous characteristics. Troops 
can only be deployed to one border at one time. Additionally, alliances can deny 
membership to those that don’t contribute to producing defense, excluding them from 
consuming the good. Born from these modifications, the joint product model indicates 
alliances should produce closer to optimal quantities of defense and distribute burdens 
more equitably than the pure public good model. 
 Lake (1996) synthesizes these approaches in conceptualizing security 
relationships on a continuum based on the degree of control exercised by a dominant 
state. States prefer more binding or hierarchical relationships to less binding or anarchical 
ones, but these agreements are costly. The costs of governing these relationships 
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determine the specific character of the relationship. Lake also links the literature on 
alliance formation to systemic theories of international relations (like those described 
above), noting, “explanations of alliance formation and imperialism share a common 
focus on capability aggregation” (Lake 1996, 4). In a later article, Lake (2007) finds 
states in these types of security relationships engage in the sorts of security-autonomy 
trade offs identified by Morrow (1991). Dominant states assume the defense burdens or 
their subordinates in exchange for controls on their behavior.  
 Motivating threats are largely exogenous to the models presented above. Altfeld 
and Bueno de Mesquita (1979), Powell (1999) and others instead present models in 
which a third party must choose to form an alliance with one of two other states, or 
remain neutral. Both models assume an ongoing or prospective war motivates alliance 
formation. Powell’s model also focuses on the internal bargaining dynamics of an 
alliance. When choosing an alliance, a state wants to maximize its chances of winning the 
war while also maximizing its bargaining power vis-à-vis its ally. These contradictory 
pressures produce the aligning state’s decision. The model presented in the next section 
draws on some elements of each of these accounts in motivating the behavior of the third 
party in a power transition. 
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Specifying a Three Actor Model of Power Transition 
I model these dynamics using a two period game with three actors (see Figure 1).  
A hegemon (D) and a challenger (R) compete over a fixed set of international benefits. At 
the beginning of the game, the distribution of benefits between R and D reflects their 
relative power (D: 
€ 
p ; R: 
€ 
1− p).16 As the hegemon, D retains the allegiance of a third 
state, A of strategic value 
€ 
δ . D receives a fixed percentage of this strategic value,
€ 
δ ∗(1−α) , and A receives the remainder, 
€ 
δ ∗α . A’s support of D requires it to fight with 
D should war with R break out. A’s willingness to fight this war (
€ 
cA ) is private 
information. D and R’s power are equal to the probabilities that they win a war against 
one another. If war breaks out, the winner receives a payoff of 1 and the loser a payoff of 
0, adjusted for the costs of war and the benefits received from the ally’s support.  
 In the first move, Nature (N) assigns R to one of two types. With probability 
€ 
Ω, R 
is assigned a positive power growth trajectory relative to D (the magnitude of which is 
determined by 
€ 
t ). With probability 
€ 
1−Ω, R’s power remains unchanged for the duration 
of the game. R’s type is private information. These specifications attempt to capture the 
high degree of uncertainty that often surrounds the growth trajectories and ambitions of 
rising powers. In the game’s first three moves, R’s power equals 
€ 
1− p , regardless of its 
type. In the final two moves, however, R’s power increases to 
€ 
1− pt  if it is of the growing 
type, while D’s power decreases to 
€ 
pt  (
€ 
t >1).  
   After being assigned its type, R can attempt to induce A to defect and gain its 
allegiance through an offer 
€ 
π . If R makes this offer and A chooses to defect, 
€ 
π   
                                                 
16 Powell (1996a) finds this type of benefits distribution is least likely to produce war. 
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Figure 1: A Three Actor Model of Power Transition 
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growing R’s offer causes A to defect, it assumes hegemony and revises the distribution of 
benefits between R and D to reflect the new distribution of power (R payoff: 
€ 
(1− pt +δ)∗(1−π ), A payoff: 
€ 
(1− pt +δ)∗π ). If A does not defect and R is growing, it 
must go to war with D if it wishes to revise the original distribution of benefits. The 
stagnant R also prefers that A defect. In this case, R receives 
€ 
δ , but is assumed to be 
unable to carry out the functions of the hegemonic state, and does not provide A its 
proposed share of benefits (
€ 
π ). D continues receiving a proportion of A’s strategic value 
but A ceases receiving the remainder of its strategic value.17 R is faced with a dilemma 
here. First, if it chooses to make an offer, it wants to offer the minimum 
€ 
π  that A will 
accept, but due to its uncertainty about 
€ 
cA , it does not know this value. Moreover, it 
wants to ensure that its offer doesn’t threaten D such that it will choose to initiate 
preventive war. 
 D considers this decision in the next move, after observing R’s offer to A. 
Choosing to continue rather than to war is a weakly dominant strategy when R is 
stagnant, but if R is growing, D may prefer to fight this preventive war to waiting to 
potentially cede hegemony or fight a more powerful R. D’s strategic problem is made 
more acute when A’s potential behavior is taken into account. If A defects to a growing R, 
D cedes hegemony over A to R. If A defects to a stagnant R, D maintains control over the 
                                                 
17 Note that in this outcome, both D and R profit from their relationship with A, but A receives nothing in 
return. This assumption is likely to be contentious so I defend it briefly here. The model interprets this 
decision as a mistake. A believed it would receive benefits from the challenger and found after it realigned 
its foreign policy that this was not the case. Alternatively, this outcome can be thought of as describing 
scenarios of contested hegemony, in which a subordinate defects but its new patron cannot carry through on 
its promises. The challenger receives benefits in the form of diplomatic support from the third party, but the 
hegemon retains hegemony and the benefits that come along with it. The subordinate receives nothing and 
its foreign policy choice becomes a protest vote. Venezuela’s highly-visible denouncements of U.S. 
hegemony and its relationships with Russia and China might be thought of in this way. See David R. 
Mares, “The United States-Venezuela Relationship,” memo prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations, 
January 19, 2012. 
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distribution of benefits vis-à-vis R and continues receiving the benefits from its 
relationship with A. If D chooses to launch a preventive war, it receives a payoff of 
€ 
p +δ ∗(1−α) − cD . 
 If D passes on the opportunity to initiate preventive war, A must decide whether 
to maintain its support of D or defect and support R. The model indicates A has two goals 
when making this decision: first, to avoid a decision that may lead to war and second, to 
maximize its share of benefits. Its strategic problem is it does not know whether R is 
growing or stagnant, and thus cannot guarantee that it will receive benefits if it defects, or 
that R will not war if it chooses to maintain its support of D.  
 If A maintains its support of D, R decides whether to wage war against the 
combined power of D and A in pursuit of hegemony. Its odds of winning this war are 
improved if it is the growing type, but it strictly prefers peace if it is the stagnant type. If 
A defects, the game ends peacefully. A growing R revises the distribution of benefits vis-
à-vis D and receives the benefits of hegemony over A, while a stagnant R receives only 
the value of support from A, lacking the power to challenge D. 
Assumptions and Alternatives 
 As is the case with all formal models of international politics, mine is a significant 
departure from reality. Here, I make explicit the model’s assumptions and comment on 
alternative ways to represent the same strategic setting. I also speculate on how 
representing the model differently might change its findings.  
 First, the model adheres to a zero sum logic that may not closely reflect the reality 
of world politics and may predispose the model toward war outcomes. The model 
assumes a fixed set of benefits, making any individual state’s welfare gains come at the 
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expense of others. Gartzke (2007) argues while competition to control material resources 
is often zero-sum, states often share interests when competing over policies. If states have 
similar policy goals, they may choose cooperative paths that result in increased welfare 
for all. He finds developed economies, which often share interests, are less likely to go to 
war with one another. 
 Second, the model does not allow the hegemon and challenger to bargain with one 
another, instead presenting each with the choice to accept a certain distribution of 
benefits or war to change that distribution. This structure creates a set of benefits 
distributions that both sides might prefer to war, but are unable to attain. While this 
model captures the commitment problem induced by shifting power (Powell 2006), it 
may exaggerate the likelihood that this commitment problem leads to war. The model 
refrains from introducing this type of bargaining for technical simplicity. 
 Third, the model simplifies the power transition to a two-period setting, in which 
the power transition occurs instantaneously. This assumption contradicts the power 
transition models of Powell (1996) and Kim and Morrow (1992), which use repeated 
games to analyze at which time in a power transition war is most likely. In these games, 
the players choose to continue or war at each time 
€ 
t . My two-period representation 
presents both R and D with a binary choice. D must decide whether to launch a 
preventive war or accede to a potential power transition. If A doesn’t defect, R must 
either war to change the distribution of benefits or accept the original distribution. 
 Fourth, A’s strategic choices are constrained considerably by the model. In reality, 
states rarely align their foreign policies perfectly with another state. Their foreign policies 
are better thought of as divisible between the priorities of two outside competitors for 
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influence. If A were instead allowed to apportion its foreign policy between R and D in 
exchange for some benefits from both, R and D may be less likely to choose war. 
Moreover, this structure may conform closer to reality. Choosing neutrality is also 
precluded by the structure of the model. While this choice structure may exaggerate R 
and D’s incentives for war, it nonetheless captures well the contours of the strategic 
dilemma facing a weaker state between two powers in transition. 
 Fifth, the model’s assumptions on information asymmetry may not be valid. R’s 
growth trajectory may be unknown to itself, in addition to being unknown to D and A. 
Substantively, I argue it is fair to assume that R has better information than A and D about 
the state of its economy and its ability to convert domestic resources into power. 
Technically, removing R’s private information would also weaken the strategic dynamics 
as the game, as the behavior of each actor would be based predominantly on their beliefs 
about R’s type. Its offer would convey little information to D and A. A’s private 
information concerning its willingness to fight also raises potential problems of 
interpretation. This term might instead be argued to be common information, as both R 
and D could observe the domestic political conditions in A and infer its willingness to 
support D in wartime. However, A is likely to have strong incentives to misrepresent this 
value in order to extract larger offers from R and D (Fearon 1995).18 Therefore, the 
international image put forth by A is likely to diverge from its leaders’ true willingness to 
fight. This divergence provides justification for modeling A’s willingness to fight as 
private information. This assumption also motivates the strategic calculations of both R 
                                                 
18 Note that these dynamics are not modeled explicitly, but provide support for the assumption that A’s 
willingness to fight should be modeled as private information. 
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and D, who must form beliefs on this value and decide how to act in advance of A’s 
defection decision. 
 Finally, D’s strategic flexibility is limited by the structure of the model. When 
faced with a growing R, it cannot contest hegemony if A defects, or bargain to assuage an 
R that would prefer to war when A doesn’t defect. This makes its decision to wage 
preventive war incredibly consequential and may bias it to choose this option more 
frequently than it would otherwise. Nevertheless, I argue its preventive war decision node 
accurately captures the strategic dilemma facing a declining hegemon—it must balance 
concerns about potential power shifts and allies’ defection against a desire to avoid costly 
war. 
 Overall, these critiques indicate the model in its present form may be biased 
toward war outcomes. The incomplete information modeled may work to counteract this 
bias, however. Because D cannot be sure that R is the growing type, it is less likely to 
launch a preventive war than it would be under a complete information setting in which R 
was always growing. In this way, incomplete information works to ameliorate the 
commitment problem inherent in this strategic setting. This setting also captures well the 
dilemmas of declining hegemons, many of which end up in wars with challengers they 
would have preferred to fight earlier, had they know the challenger’s type ex ante.  
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 The model yields four unique sets of equilibria, based on D and R’s willingness to 
fight and the presence of a transition. Both to simplify analysis and to focus on the 
specific power transition setting, I analyze just one of these sets. In it, a transition is 
ongoing and R prefers war to ~war after a transition. This setting describes well the 
power transitions that are this study’s focus. If the challenger does not achieve hegemony 
peacefully, it is wiling to fight for that hegemony. The hegemon does not strictly prefer to 
initiate preventive war, but it may do so in response to certain behavior by the challenger 
or sets of initial conditions. I solve for this game’s perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Because 
of the relative complexity of the solution, I use this section primarily to analyze and 
interpret equilibrium conditions, rather than to explain in detail how these conditions 
were derived. A full annotated proof and existence demonstrations for each case 
discussed here is included in the appendix. 
A’s Alignment Decision 
 A seeks to avoid war and maximize its benefits in its alignment decision. This 
decision is made complicated by uncertainty about R’s type. If R is of the powerful type, 
A will wish to defect for sufficiently high offers from R because maintaining its alliance 
with D will result in war with R. If R is of the weak type, however, A will never prefer to 
defect because its offers are incredible and maintaining its alliance with D will not result 
in war. As a result, A’s resolve (cA) and its belief about R’s type play strong roles in its 
decision. Figure 2 demonstrates that highly resolute As (low cA) require larger offers to 
defect to R.  
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Figure 2: A's Minimum Offer for Defection as a Function of its Costs of War (cA) 
 
p = .8     δ = .3     α = .75     Ω = .5     cD = .2     cR = .2     t = 2.5 
 
Figure 3 maps A’s minimum offer as a function of its strategic value (
€ 
δ ) and its 
belief about R’s type (
€ 
Ω). It requires low offers to defect when it is confident R is of the 
powerful type. A will never defect if its confidence in R’s power is sufficiently low. The 
minimum offer A will accept also varies with its strategic value. Figure 4 shows that 
relatively weak As are the most willing to defect. This is both because the coalition of A 
and D is more likely to win in a war when A’s strategic value is high and because A’s of 
higher strategic value are compensated at a higher level by D. 
The logic behind this pattern of behavior is simple. As A’s appetite for war 
declines, its willingness to fight to defend the status quo also declines, making it more 
willing to defect in order to avoid war. As A’s confidence in R’s power increases, it also 
becomes more confident that the challenger will be able to provide the promised 
distribution of benefits. If A believes R is weak, it sees R’s offer as cheap talk. Therefore, 
A is most willing to defect when believes R will be powerful. 
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Figure 3: A’s Minimum Offer for Defection as a Function of Belief About R and 
Strategic Value 
 
p = .8    α = .75    cD = .2     cR = .2     cA = .25     t = 2.5 
 
R’s Offer to A 
 R’s decision is somewhat less complicated. It wants to offer the minimum that 
will cause defection, while avoiding offers that will cause D to initiate preventive war. 
R’s behavior reflects these motives. Figure 4 shows how R’s offer varies as a function of 
A’s strategic value (
€ 
δ ) and D and A’s belief about R’s type (
€ 
Ω). First, note that R makes 
no offer in regions in which 
€ 
Ω is both large and small. In the region in which 
€ 
Ω is large, 
R makes no offer because D prefers initiating preventive war regardless of R’s offer. In 
the region in which 
€ 
Ω is small, A’s minimum 
€ 
π  for defection is greater than 1. In these 
cases, there is no offer that will cause defection, so R offers 0. R’s offer is increasing in  
€ 
δ , as the benefits to R from inducing defection increase as A’s strategic value increases. 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
∆
0.0
0.5
1.0
￿
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
	   34 
Figure 4: R’s Offer as a Function of D/A Belief and A’s Strategic Value 
 
p = .8    α = .75    cD = .2     cR = .2     cA = .25     t = 2.5 
 
D’s Preventive War Decision 
 D weighs fears of abandonment by its subordinate and of fighting from a position 
of weakness in deciding when to initiate preventive war after observing R’s offer to A. D 
is most likely to initiate preventive war when it believes R is the powerful type and when 
the strategic value of its subordinate is relatively high. The logic behind this appraisal is 
simple. The costs of lost hegemony are higher as the strategic value of D’s subordinate 
increases, and the perceived likelihood of losing hegemony or fighting from a position of 
weakness increases as D becomes more confident that R is of the powerful type. 
 While D’s behavior is highly responsive to changes in exogenous variables, the 
general trends described above hold in most plausible cases. These patterns suggests that 
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D is willing to cede hegemony to R only when the value of its ally is relatively low. 
Nevertheless, D strictly prefers war when it is sufficiently confident that R is of the 
powerful type.  
Hypotheses 
 Collectively, these decisions produce three potential outcomes: 
1. D initiates preventive war. 
2. D chooses not to initiate preventive war and A defects, resulting in a peaceful 
hegemonic transition. 
3. D chooses not to initiate preventive war but A does not defect, resulting in a 
hegemonic war post-transition. 
Figure 5: Outcomes as a Function of Belief About R and A’s Strategic Value 
 
p = .8    α = .75    cD = .2     cR = .2     cA = .25     t = 2.5 
 
 
Figure 5 maps these outcomes as a function of A’s strategic value (
€ 
δ ) and the 
belief about R’s type (
€ 
Ω). D will initiate preventive war when it believes R will be 
powerful and the value of its ally is sufficiently high. A will maintain its alliance and R 
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will fight post-transition when A’s strategic value is high and D and A believe it will be 
weak. A peaceful hegemonic transition will occur when the strategic value of A is 
relatively low. 
 The players’ collective behavior demonstrates several unique characteristics of 
the three-player power transition game. First, R faces competing pressures on how to 
present its foreign policy to external audiences. A will only defect if it believes R is 
sufficiently powerful and capable of providing public goods. However, D is more likely 
to initiate preventive war if it believes R is the powerful type. While D and A’s beliefs 
about R’s type are exogenous in this model, these pressures indicate that R will face 
competing incentives to both present a muscular foreign policy and to hide its 
capabilities. 
Second, R’s offers are rarely sufficient to produce defection. While historical 
hegemonic challengers are often depicted as strongly revisionist, the model instead 
predicts conservative behavior from challengers. R rarely makes an offer that produces 
defection by A, and oftentimes makes no offer. This conservative behavior is largely the 
result of the threat of preventive war by D. The hegemon’s dominant position allows it to 
deter challenges to its portfolio of subordinate states, as it can credibly commit to 
initiating preventive war if the strategic value of its subordinate is sufficiently high. This 
pattern of behavior leads to the following prediction: 
H1: In a war between a hegemon and challenger, the hegemon’s portfolio of 
subordinate states will have more strategic value than that of the challenger.  
 
Third, D’s decision to initiate preventive war is dependent on the strategic value 
of its ally. While D either initiates preventive war or succeeds in deterring challenges 
when its ally’s value is high, it is much less likely to do so when its subordinate’s value is 
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low. Simply, defection by more valuable subordinates is more consequential for the 
hegemon. As a consequence, D becomes more likely fight a preventive war as the value 
of its subordinate increases. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2: A hegemon is most likely to peacefully transfer hegemony vis-à-vis a 
subordinate state when the strategic value of that subordinate is relatively low.
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Empirical Approach 
 This study’s primary focus is on the development of a three-actor model of power 
transition and the derivation of hypotheses from that model. Due to that focus, I have 
eschewed a rigorous empirical approach in favor of illustrative case studies, designed to 
demonstrate the feasibility of my hypotheses. This section should be seen as an existence 
proof of my theory. More research is required to determine the generalizability of the 
theory and to improve upon its predictive power. 
 This study’s empirical focus is on the relationship between global hegemons and 
their challengers. Usually, these states are the two most powerful actors in the 
international system. Lemke (2002; 52) provides a theoretical justification for focusing 
on transitions among the most powerful actors in the international system. Absent 
interference from larger powers, we should observe similar patterns of behavior from 
weaker states engaged in power transition. In reality, however, great power interference 
in the affairs of weaker states is commonplace in international relations. This makes the 
task of teasing out the impact of the power transition itself a difficult one, as larger power 
interference, rather than the transition itself, may be driving state behavior in these dyads. 
Therefore, I restrict my set of potential cases to those that involve the decline of a global 
hegemon.  
Figure 6 shows the energy consumption of the largest four energy consumers in 
the international system (since 1856)19 as a proportion of the total energy consumption of 
these states (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972).20 I use this data to measure hegemonic 
                                                 
19 I choose this date for both its historical significance (the end of the Crimean War) and because the 
industrial revolution had begun to diffuse at this point, providing states other than Britain with the 
technology necessary to compete for hegemony.  
20	  Data from Correlates of War Project’s National Material Capabilities dataset. 
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potential rather than employing relative capability metrics, as are used in most power 
transition studies. I adopt this methodology because relative power metrics are likely to 
better reflect changes in a state’s threat environment, rather than its capacity to engage in 
hegemonic activities. For example, while Russia and Britain attained similar degrees of 
relative power in the first half of the 18th century, Britain’s energy consumption was 
exponentially greater. These differences in domestic conditions were reflected in each 
states’ foreign policies. While Britain pursued a global foreign policy, seeking markets 
and raw materials from around the world, Russia focused its attention on its immediate 
periphery. I argue Britain’s international behavior was clearly more hegemonic, and that 
energy consumption is a better metric for capturing the capacity to engage in this sort of 
behavior. 
Figure 6: Energy Consumption Shares Among Contenders, 1856-2007 
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 To populate the list of hegemons and challengers, I begin by assuming that Britain 
was the global hegemon in 1856. From there, any state that attains a level of energy 
consumption share of at least 80 percent of that of Britain and maintains this relative 
level for at least three years is considered a hegemonic challenger. I then assume that 
global hegemony was ceded to the United States in 1945 and reapply this method to 
populate the list of challengers of U.S. hegemony.21 
Table 1: Hegemonic Decline and Potential Cases 
Hegemon Challenger(s) Becomes 
Challenger: 
Outcome 
United States 1887 Partial hegemonic transition 1904, full 
hegemonic transition 1945  
Germany 1908 Hegemonic war 1914 
Germany 1918 Hegemonic war 1939 
Britain 
Soviet Union 1939 Partial hegemonic transition 1945 
United 
States 
Soviet Union 1981 Collapse of Soviet Union 1991 
 
In order to test my hypotheses (on the relative power of the hegemon and 
challenger’s portfolios of subordinate states and the necessary conditions for a peaceful 
transition to occur), I need to examine a case of hegemonic war at relative power parity 
and a case of peaceful transition. Britian’s hegemonic decline though the end of the 19th 
century and early 20th century provides these cases. These power transitions – vis-à-vis 
the United States and Germany – should obviously not be viewed in isolation. The 
simultaneous power transitions certainly produced strong interactive effects that shaped 
British foreign policy, and cloud our ability to ascribe the behavior of interest solely to 
the presence of a given power transition. Additionally, the domestic political institutions 
                                                 
21 This method contradicts this study’s focus on relational hegemony by assuming that hegemony is a 
global condition rather than a descriptor of dyadic relations. I employ this method to illustrate in loose 
terms against which cases the theory should be evaluated. 
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of the United States and Germany, the difference in geographic distance between the 
powers, and other variables outside of the model had an impact on the foreign policies 
pursued by these challengers, and are not controlled for in this analysis. These problems 
will plague any qualitative analysis of my theory. Nevertheless, focusing on these 
transitions allows us to control for the potential impact of domestic political institutions 
on the behavior of the hegemon, as both challengers challenged Britain at similar times. 
Operationalization of Variables of Interest 
H1: In a war between a hegemon and challenger, the hegemon’s portfolio of 
subordinate states will have more strategic value than that of the challenger.  
 
 Here, we must determine which states constitute the hegemon and challenger’s 
subordinates and those subordinates’ relative strategic value at the time of hegemonic 
war. My model is designed to explain challenges to hegemonic relationships between a 
hegemon and its subordinates, adopting the contractual framework described by Lake 
(1996). In the post-World War II world, many of these relationships have been 
formalized in the form of alliances. Prior to this, however, alliances were usually 
employed to structure relations between relatively powerful states. Great powers often 
employed more coercive apparatuses to exercise control over weaker states’ foreign 
policies.  
In general, challenges to colonial empires – the most coercive of these 
relationships – cannot be explained by the model. The model assumes that the third party 
has some minimum degree of autonomy over its foreign policy, such that it can choose 
freely to associate itself with another great power. Because colonies were generally 
directly administered by the larger power, they cannot be considered to have this 
autonomy. 
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This leaves the set of all other self-governed states as potential allies for the larger 
powers. I use COW’s State System Membership dataset to populate this list. While the 
previous discussion of security relationships between states demonstrates my hesitancy to 
equate an alliance with hegemony vis-à-vis a subordinate, indices of relational hegemony 
are not well-developed, and data limitations for this time period would make constructing 
one difficult. I therefore use COW’s Formal Alliance dataset and COW energy 
consumption data to classify foreign policy orientation and approximate the strategic 
values of the hegemon and challenger’s alliance portfolios at the time of hegemonic 
war.22 In a war setting, this departure is less troubling, as states are likely to reveal their 
foreign policy preferences at the outbreak of war and align themselves accordingly. 
H2: A hegemon is most likely to peacefully transfer hegemony vis-à-vis a 
subordinate state when the strategic value of that subordinate is relatively low. 
 
 The preceding discussion highlights the importance of clearly defining hegemony. 
Hegemony does not describe the capabilities of a potential hegemon, rather the nature of 
that states’ interactions with other states. Thus a power transition and a hegemonic 
transition, while often correlated, are theoretically distinct. A hegemon’s capabilities may 
erode, but it may simultaneously maintain the allegiance of subordinate states, thus 
maintaining hegemony. In some ways, this study can be seen as an attempt to understand 
to what extent hegemonic decline and power transition among the largest states in the 
international system are correlated. Therefore, it is important to develop independent 
definitions of power transition and hegemony. 
                                                 
22 Again, I use energy consumption data here rather than CINC scores (measuring relative power) to 
capture power potential, rather than realized power. Lake (2007) also provides justification for using this 
metric by finding that subordinates spend relatively less on their militaries, outsourcing security provision 
to the hegemon. I provide CINC scores for comparison. 
	   44 
 The problem with developing an independent definition of hegemony is that it 
proves very difficult to operationalize. Lake (2007) operationalizes “hierarchy” through a 
set of security and economic indicators. His approach is useful in that it is a relational 
approach to defining hegemony, focusing on the nature of the relationship between a 
dominant state and its subordinate, rather than simply the capabilities of the dominant 
state. Unfortunately, his dataset only covers the world since 1950. In the absence of an 
accepted method to operationalize hegemony, I employ an unsatisfying but more 
descriptively accurate qualitative approach. As defined in the introduction, a hegemon 
supplies club goods to supporting states in exchange for revenue. Therefore, we should 
expect a hegemon to assume the exclusive provision of these club goods, such as dispute 
resolution mechanisms, pressures for low tariffs, and pressures for financial stability. 
Concurrently, we should expect subordinate states to subordinate to some extent their 
foreign policies to the preferences of the hegemon. 
 I use the NMC dataset’s energy consumption data to measure the strategic value 
of the hegemon’s subordinates. Based on the hypothesis, I anticipate hegemons will 
peacefully cede hegemony when the value of the states in question is relatively low. 
Historical Narrative 
 In 1871, Britain possessed more than two times the military capabilities of 
Germany and the United States, and consumed approximately three times as much energy 
as each of these two future competitors (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972). It used these 
fundamentals of power to establish a global colonial empire and promote and enforce 
systems of trade and monetary relations between states around the world. This period 
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corresponded with the proliferation of relatively open trading policies around the world, 
and a commensurate increase in the volume of global trade (McKeown 1983). 
 A constellation of other large powers occupied the second tier in the international 
hierarchy. In addition to the United States and Germany, Russia, France, and Austro-
Hungary possessed relatively large sums of military power and pursued imperial foreign 
policies. Over the next 40 years, the United States and Germany rose from this pack of 
great powers and develop the military and economic might necessary to challenge the 
hegemonic position of Britain. 
At this time, Britain and Germany’s leaders could not envision a war with one 
another. British leaders considered war with the United States a more likely possibility.23 
The key question that this study strives to answer is why these perceptions evolved. Why 
did Britain ultimately contest German power in Europe and wage war to defend its 
position, while acceding to an American challenge in the Western Hemisphere?  
The German Challenge 
Britain declined to intervene in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. Both the French 
and the Prussians reached agreements with Britain to refrain from invading Belgium 
during the course of prosecuting the war, satisfying Britain’s concerns over Belgian 
neutrality (Kennedy 1980, 22). The war laid the foundation for the unification of the 
independent German states with Prussia, and the resultant increase in German economic 
might and political influence.  
                                                 
23 “London occasionally worried about a conflict with Russia, or even with France or the United States. 
Berlin more frequently worried about a conflict with France, or with Russia, or even with Austria-Hungary. 
There was never any thought of an Anglo-German war, and that in itself was a significant fact.” (Kennedy 
1980; 37) 
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 German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck played a key roll in the high diplomacy of 
European politics until his resignation in 1890. During this time of fluid foreign policy 
alignment, Germany signed the Triple Alliance with Austro-Hungary and Italy, and 
considered forming alliances with both Britain and France. Germany and Britain were 
brought together by a common fear of Russian expansionism, but German ambitions also 
instilled antagonistic roots in the bilateral relationship.  
 Through two centuries of imperial expansion, Britain established a global colonial 
empire that fed its industries raw materials and served as external markets for British 
finished goods. As its domestic economy grew, German business interests pressured their 
government to seek extra-European colonies to provide alternative markets for German 
goods (Kennedy 1980, 167-168). The problem facing the German government was that 
there was little remaining territory suitable for colonization – other European powers had 
already established colonial empires that covered much of the world’s surface. Steadily 
growing German grievances resulted in some concessions and a set of rules for 
colonization established at the Conference of Berlin in 1884 and 1885, however, in 
general, Britain and the other established powers resisted German colonial claims. The 
result was that Imperial Germany never attained a colonial empire commensurate with its 
international political power. This disparity resulted in increased Anglo-German tensions, 
particularly during the Second Boer War (1899-1902), where British fears of imperial 
fragility combined with evidence of German collaboration with the Boers to sour bilateral 
relations.   
 1897 was a watershed in Anglo German relations. Germany began a program of 
naval development designed to protect German economic interests and further its 
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international political ambitions. The development of a formidable fleet was consistent 
with the larger German strategy of Weltpolitik, which called for the aggressive pursuit of 
international influence. In the wake of these developments, Anglo-German relations 
soured considerably. In 1904, Britain and France concluded the Entente Cordiale, which 
later evolved into the Triple Entente, incorporating Russia into the alliance (Kennedy 
1980, 268). That same year, Italy defected from the Triple Alliance, leaving only German 
and Austro-Hungary united in Central Europe against an increasingly close nit group of 
powers arrayed around their borders. 
 German power continued to grow relative to that of Britain, and 10 years later, 
these competing alliance blocs would launch themselves into World War I. During these 
pre-war years, British leaders became increasingly concerned that German power and 
pressure would result in French defection from the Triple Entente, as the balance of 
power between these continental powers shifted.24 These leaders reasoned that this would 
place the European continent under German dominance, at the expense of British 
interests. 
The American Challenge 
 In contrast to the relative apathy shown toward newly-unified Germany in 1871, 
Britain was tangled in a series of disputes with the United States following the U.S. Civil 
War (1861-1865). British material support for the Confederacy during the war had 
angered some American leaders, and the U.S. government sought payment for damages 
in the form of the Alabama Claims. While negotiation over the claims was ongoing, 
hawkish U.S. politicians agitated for the annexation of Canada (then a British colony) 
                                                 
24 “It was precisely the breakdown of the European equilibrium following Russia’s defeat, and the fear that 
France might be compelled by diplomatic or even military pressure into dependence upon an all-powerful 
Germany, which so alarmed anti-German circles in Britain.” (Kennedy 1980, 278) 
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and the U.S. government concluded the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867 
(Campbell 2007, 176). The Alabama Claims were settled with a $15.5 million payment 
from Britain to the United States, and U.S. President Andrew Johnson’s demobilization 
of the U.S. military improved the bilateral relationship (Campbell 2007, 182). Still, the 
two countries frequently came into conflict over the rights of fisherman and hunters on 
the U.S.-Canadian border throughout the remainder of the 19th century (Campbell 2007, 
187-188). 
 In 1895, independent Venezuela came into conflict with the British colonial 
government in British Guiana over the boundary between the two entities. The 
Venezuelan government invoked the Monroe Doctrine and urged the United States 
government to intervene in the dispute. The British government argued the dispute was 
strictly bilateral, but U.S. President Grover Cleveland argued the United States had the 
right to declare and enforce a boundary between the two territories. Ultimately, a 
commission with both American and British representatives was formed to draw a 
border. In 1898, the United States provoked and prosecuted the Spanish-American War, 
resulting in substantially increased U.S. power and authority in the Caribbean (Campbell 
2007, 191). In 1901, the U.S. and British governments concluded the Hay-Pauncefote 
treaty, which gave the United States the exclusive right to construct and administer a 
canal connecting the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea across the Central American 
isthmus (Adams 2005, 34).  
 Anglo-Venezuelan tensions reignited in 1902, when Venezuelan dictator Cipriano 
Castro refused to pay debts owed to Germany and Britain, resulting in a joint Anglo-
German blockade of Venezuelan ports. In this case, the U.S. government, led by 
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President Theodore Roosevelt, chose not to intervene. The United States demonstrated a 
similar pattern of behavior in earlier European disputes with Guatemala and the 
Dominican Republic, allowing the debtors to use coercion to collect debts (Adams 2005, 
37-38).25 The blockade worried other South American states, however. Argentine 
Minister of Foreign Relations Louis Drago implored the United States to take action to 
end the blockade (Adams 2005, 64). 
 With Britain confronting challenges around the world at the time, the British navy 
decided to withdraw significant forces from the Caribbean, leaving only one cruiser 
squadron (Adams 2005, 74).26 And as the British withdrew from the region, U.S. 
President Roosevelt articulated an increasingly active and muscular role for the United 
States in Latin America. In what became known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the 
Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt stated: 
Chronic wrong-doing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the 
ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require 
intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the 
adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United 
States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impotence, 
to the exercise of international police power (Adams 2005, 75). 
 
 In the years following the announcements, British military activity in the region 
subsided considerably.27 Additionally, the United States began enforcing standards of 
                                                 
25 The editor of the New York Times at the time wrote, “We do not, Monroe Doctrine or no Monroe 
Doctrine, ‘stand for’ fraudulent debtors, any more than we stand for nests of pirates or highwaymen.” 
(Adams 2005, 43) 
26 Some British leaders also urged the United States to take a more active role in the region. A British 
government spokesman in 1903 said, “I believe it would be a great gain to civilization if the United States 
of America were more actively to interest themselves in making arrangements by which these constantly 
recurring difficulties between European powers and certain States in South America could be avoided.” 
(Adams 2005, 63)	  
27 “When the question of hemispheric responsibility had been in doubt, Britain would, in the last resort, 
would undertake naval operations in South America to protect her interests. The Roosevelt Corollary, 
however, largely brought this to an end. Although its worth was yet to be proved, Britain welcomed 
Roosevelt’s strengthened Monroe Doctrine. Once the United States had made clear their determination to 
police the entirety of South and Central America, affairs in the region calmed down and the possibility of 
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international behavior among Central and South American states. Latin American 
sovereign debt prices rose dramatically in the wake of the announcement of the Roosevelt 
Corollary, indicating that the United States was quite successful in assuming the 
international enforcement role of the European powers in the Western Hemisphere 
(Mitchener and Weidenmeir 2005). 
Empirical Analysis 
H1: In a war between a hegemon and challenger, the hegemon’s portfolio of 
subordinate states will have more strategic value than that of the challenger. 
  
Table 2: Energy Consumption and CINC for German and British Allies 
1914 
Britain Germany 
Ally CINC Energy 
Consumption 
Ally CINC Energy 
Consumption 
France .075 45084 Austro-
Hungary 
.068 32416 
Japan .032 24190 Italy .025 10508 
Spain .014 7300 Turkey .012 660 
Portugal .003 1251 Bulgaria .002 375 
   Romania .006 1902 
Total .124 77825 Total .113 45861 
 
1915 
Britain Germany 
Ally CINC Energy 
Consumption 
Ally CINC Energy 
Consumption 
France .079 39355 Austro-
Hungary 
.062 28000 
Japan .027 22168 Italy .034 9206 
Spain .010 6657 Turkey .009 496 
Portugal .003 1210 Bulgaria .001 169 
Italy .034 9206 Romania .004 2607 
Russia .123 44769    
Total .276 123365 Total .11 40478 
 
                                                 
another serious dispute, though never wholly disregarded, no longer was considered imminent.” (Adams 
2005, 76) 
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 While alliance patterns in Europe were quite fluid during the era described above, 
Table 2 demonstrates that at the time of war, the potential power of Britain’s alliance bloc 
(measured using energy consumption) was far greater than that of Germany. The 
solidification of these alliance blocs corresponded with Germany’s emergence as the 
most powerful potential challenger to British hegemony. CINC scores paint a more 
muddied picture in 1914, in which the power of each alliance bloc was relatively equal. 
However, Russia formally allied with Britain and Italy defected from the Triple Alliance 
in 1915, diminishing further the power of Germany’s bloc of allies. 
H2: A hegemon is most likely to peacefully transfer hegemony vis-à-vis a 
subordinate state when the strategic value of that subordinate is relatively low. 
 
Table 3: Energy Consumption and CINC for European and Latin American States, 
1904 
Latin America Europe 
State CINC Energy 
Consumption 
State CINC Energy 
Consumption 
Cuba .001 5 Netherlands .007 6076 
Haiti .001 0 Belgium .015 21800 
Dominican 
Republic 
0 0 France .07 47614 
Mexico .005 0 Switzerland .002 2267 
Guatemala .001 0 Spain .014 5426 
Honduras 0 0 Portugal .004 965 
El Salvador 0 0 Austro-
Hungary* 
.042 21920 
Nicaragua 0 0 Italy* .028 6143 
Panama N/A N/A Yugoslavia .002 64 
Colombia .001 0 Greece .002 131 
Venezuela .001 0 Romania* .004 701 
Ecuador 0 0 Russia .113 37584 
Peru .001 0 Sweden .009 3944 
Brazil .01 0 Denmark .002 2405 
Bolivia 0 0 Turkey .016 519 
Paraguay 0 0    
Chile .002 0    
Argentina .005 0    
Uruguay .001 0    
Total .029 5 Total .33 157559 
*Indicates active alliance with Germany. 
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 Table 3 shows the strategic value of all independent states in Latin America and 
Europe in 1904, when I argue Britain ceded hegemony over Latin America to the United 
States. The results confirm the hypothesis for the period examined. In Europe, the most 
powerful second-tier states aligned their foreign policies with that of Britain once 
Germany emerged as the clear number two in the local power hierarchy. Germany 
succeeded in producing defections from a series of less-powerful states, including 
Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Romania. The most important swing states in Europe, Russia 
and France, ultimately rebuffed German diplomatic advances. Therefore, Britain acceded 
to challenges to its hegemony in Europe in cases in which subordinate states’ strategic 
value was relatively low, while resisting challenges to hegemony vis-à-vis more powerful 
subordinates. Table 3 also indicates that hegemony over Latin America was virtually 
value-less. Consequently, Britain allowed the United States to assume hegemony over the 
region without conflict.  
 While this hypothesis enjoys support from the two cases studied here, other cases 
appear to contradict it. The British-American power transition continued after the First 
World War, and Britain ultimately ceded hegemony over many other, arguable more 
strategically valuable regions of the world to the United States and the Soviet Union 
without conflict. While these shifts might be considered the result of the international 
political shock of the Second World War, they nonetheless occurred over a period of 
many years, in which British power proved unable to maintain order in regions of 
strategic significance to the United States (Little 2002). The equilibrium set analyzed 
here cannot explain this behavior.  
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Directions for Further Empirical Research 
 This study highlights the importance of the need to operationalizing hegemony on 
a dyadic basis. Hegemony should not be measured simply by the capabilities of the 
hegemon, but by its relationship to potential subordinate states. COW’s alliance data has 
been used to approximate these relationships, but a hegemonic relationship need not be 
formalized in an alliance. Lake’s (2007) hierarchy data provides a set of metrics to 
measure hegemony in the post-World War II world. Unfortunately, only a very limited 
set of power transitions can be tested against this data, and none that resulted in a 
systemic war. Future empirical research should focus on how to extend Lake’s data to the 
pre-World War II era. 
 Additionally, this study employed blunt metrics to measure the strategic value of 
a hegemon’s subordinates. Future work should seek to measure to what extent the 
hegemon’s economic well-being and security position is dependent on maintaining its 
relationship with a given subordinate. This could be approximated through an index that 
incorporates bilateral trade and investment, as well as measures of military integration, 
such as numbers of bases and troops on the territory of the subordinate and port access 
rights. 
 Finally, more research is needed to resolve the empirical contradictions discussed 
in the preceding analysis and further explore these hypotheses’ applicability outside of 
the cases put forth here. More conclusive empirical results will follow from better 
defining variables of interest and expanding the analysis to include all cases of power 
transition among the leading actors in the system. 
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Theoretical Contributions 
 Power transition theory holds that shifts in power between a hegemon and 
challenger are necessary to produce systemic war, and that this war is most likely to 
occur when the power of the hegemon and challenger are roughly equal. Hegemonic 
stability theory holds that international relations are made most stable by a public goods 
providing hegemon, which is usually the dominant power in the international system. 
Keohane (1984) and others challenged this theory, arguing that the regimes produced by 
a hegemon could outlast its decline in relative power. The three actor model of power 
transition provides a means through which to reconcile these alternative approaches to 
explaining systemic change in international relations. 
 The hegemon’s relative power position allows it to prevent the defection of high-
value subordinates through deterrence. Therefore, a challenger struggles to attract others 
to his cause, resulting in a depressed portfolio of subordinates. For power transition 
theory, this may help in explaining why exactly so many challengers are “dissatisfied” 
with the international system. Not only does the hegemon structure the international 
system to serve its own interests, but it successfully resists challenges to these 
arrangements. The challenger is thus often unable to peacefully restructure the system to 
serve its interests, resulting in an accumulation of grievances and a willingness to go to 
war to change the status quo. Because the challenger is deterred from challenging the 
hegemon’s position in the international system and because the hegemon’s most 
important relationships do not come under threat, these wars often occur one a significant 
sum of power has already shifted, resulting in wars at power parity. 
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 The model also provides an alternative theoretical framework that supports the 
claims of hegemonic stability theory’s revisionists. Their explanation for the longevity of 
the international system built by the hegemon rests primarily on the characteristics of that 
system’s institutions. The three actor model of power transition advances a strategic 
explanation for this longevity, rooted in the power of the relevant actors. From this 
perspective, international institutions last beyond the relatively decline of the hegemonic 
state because the hegemon is able to maintain the loyalty of its most important 
subordinates, providing the international coalition size necessary to uphold the existing 
order. 
 These contributions are unique in that they provide a conceptual link between two 
formerly disparate approaches to a similar problem. The theoretical approach advanced in 
this study ultimately examines to what extent power transitions and hegemonic 
transitions are correlated. It finds that while they are closely correlated in some cases, in 
others the hegemonic transition lags behind the power transition, providing an impetus 
for hegemonic war. 
Directions for Further Theoretical Research 
 In addition to the empirical improvements articulated in the previous section, this 
study could benefit from increased attention to both the structure of the model and the 
micro-level behavior that underpins its predictions. My model simplifies a power 
transition into a single shot game in which power shifts from the hegemon to the 
challenger. While this captures in broad strokes the strategic dilemmas facing each actor, 
it lacks the ability to capture how behavior varies across the course of the transition. 
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 Powell (1996) and Kim and Morrow (1992) develop models that instead depict 
power transitions as iterated games. While the interaction of the players in their games 
can be described in simple terms, these games become technically complex when 
iterated. They also highlight tradeoffs that confront formal modelers of power transitions. 
While their models better capture the temporal dimension of these transitions, my single 
shot game is able to incorporate interactions with third parties. The model put forth in this 
study might suffer from intractability if iterated. However, some simplifications might 
produce a model that could be iterated. This would be useful in producing predictions 
about when in the course of a transition the players’ behavior shifts. Ultimately, balance 
is required to capture both the single shot interaction between the players and its temporal 
dimensions. 
 Additionally, the predictions of the model only describe in broad strokes the 
behavior of each player. In reality, these behaviors are much more nuanced. Future 
theoretical work should explore what types of specific foreign policies correspond to the 
“grand strategies” prescribed by this model. 
 Research on the behavior of hegemons should seek to explain how these states 
make the threat to initiate preventive war credible to a prospective challenger. Go (2011) 
provides evidence that during periods of British and American decline, their propensity to 
intervene militarily in subordinate states or colonies increased. Further research should 
explore if and to what extent interventions are undertaken in order to signal resolve to a 
potential hegemonic challenger. Additionally, the United States famously adopted a 
series of foreign policy doctrines across its history that called for predetermined 
responses to threats to its international position. How effective are these doctrines in 
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deterring unwanted hegemonic challenges, and if so what is it that makes them credible? 
The hegemon’s decision in this model is simple – to wage preventive war or to pass on 
doing so. Future research should explore how the hegemon’s foreign policies evolve over 
the course of a power transition, and to what extent these behavioral changes correspond 
broadly to the predictions of this study. 
 As discussed earlier in this study, third party foreign policy alignment is better 
thought of as divisible between the hegemon and the challenger. The stark choice 
modeled here therefore dramatizes the strategic choice facing third parties to a power 
transition by making its value indivisible, which may bias this model toward war.28 
However, while defection only occurs when the value of the third party is relatively low 
in this model, an alternative representation might produce even more restrictive 
conditions for defection. In the model presented here, defection guarantees peace. In 
reality, the specter of defection might cause preventive war by the hegemon, and the third 
party could incur diplomatic and material costs for considering defection. Further 
research should seek to both accurately measure foreign policy alignment and develop 
more fully the causal mechanisms that drive changes in these alignments. 
 The model also anticipates that a challenger will balance incentives to produce 
defection against the prospect of preventive war when crafting its offer to a subordinate 
state of the hegemon. These pressures create competing incentives to appear powerful to 
the subordinate while appearing benign to the hegemon. Future research should explore 
more fully how challengers attempt to manipulate the beliefs of these two audiences, and 
whether these behaviors correspond with the contours of the model analyzed in this 
study. 
                                                 
28 See Fearon 1995. 
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 This study is an initial attempt at marrying theories of power transition with 
theories of hegemony. Scholars involved in these research programs borrow heavily from 
one another, but few explicitly advance theories that connect power transitions to 
hegemonic shifts. This study finds that hegemonic shifts do not strictly proceed in concert 
with power transitions. Rather, as power transitions proceed, hegemons maintain 
international influence disproportionate to their waning power. This finding provides a 
strategic, power-based rationale underpinning the core tenets of neoliberal 
institutionalism. It also substantiates the power parity theory of war, while explaining in 
more detail why challengers are able to avoid preventive war until power parity has been 
reached. More research is required to evaluate the validity of the hypotheses advanced by 
this study and to investigate whether the behaviors anticipated by the model are 
confirmed by lower-level analyses. 
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Game Tree and Payoffs: 
 
!
Actors: 
N – Nature 
D – Declining Hegemon 
R – Rising Challenger 
A – Aligning Third Party 
 
Variables: 
! 
p  [.5,1]- D’s initial power share 
! 
"  [0,
! 
p] - A’s strategic value 
! 
t  [1,T] - R’s rate of relative power growth 
! 
cD  [0,1] - D’s costs of war 
! 
cR  [0,1] - R’s costs of war 
! 
cA  [0,1] - A’s costs of war (private info; 
paid as a percentage of strategic value) 
! 
"  [0,1] - Share of strategic value retained 
by A under D hegemony 
! 
"  [0,1] - R’s proposed provision of joint 
benefits to A 
! 
" [0,1] – Belief about R’s type 
 
Transition 
1: 
! 
UD = p +" #(1$%) $ cD
UR =1$ p $ cR
UA = " #% $" *cA  
2: 
! 
UD = pt
UR = (1" pt +#)$(1"% )
UA = (1" pt +#)$% !
3: 
! 
UD = pt +" #(1$%) $ cD
UR =1$ pt $ cR
UA = " #% $" *cA !4: 
! 
UD = p +" #(1$%)
UR =1$ p
UA = " #%
 
Payoffs 
~Transition: 
5: 
! 
UD = p +" #(1$%) $ cD
UR =1$ p $ cR
UA = " #% $" *cA  
6: 
! 
UD = p +" #(1$%)
UR =1$ p +"
UA = 0  
7: 
! 
UD = p +" #(1$%) $ cD
UR =1$ p $ cR
UA = " #% $" *cA  
8: 
! 
UD = p +" #(1$%)
UR =1$ p
UA = " #%
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Solution Methodology
1) Suppose that D and A’s belief about R’s type is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, and let this 
value be denoted by ￿. Therefore the probability that R is of the powerful type is ￿ and the probability 
that R is of the weak type is 1 - ￿.
2) Suppose that D and R’s belief about A’s costs of war (cA) is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 
and let this value be denoted by cA￿ . If this is is the case, the probability that A will defect is cA￿ and the 
probability that it will not defect is 1 - cA￿ .
I restrict my analysis to the case in which the powerful R will fight in the final move and R is of the 
powerful type. I solve for the conditions that constitute a Perfect Bayesian equlibrium under these 
conditions in three parts. In the first case, 0 < cA￿< 1, meaning that A’s behavior is uncertain to D and R. 
In the second and third cases there is perfect information with respect to A’s anticipated behavior. In 
case 2 (cA￿  ￿ 1) A will never defect and in case 3 (cA￿  < 0) A will always defect.
After specifying the conditions that produce this equilibrium for each case, I demonstrate the existence 
of a set of conditions that produce each outcome numerically. Finally, to derive the functions needed to 
plot the equilibrium in its entirety, I write these conditions as piecewise functions that specify behavior 
for every case in this equilibrium.
Case 1 (0 < cA
￿ < 1)
Derivation of Conditions
First, R must prefer war in final move
Specify R’s utility for war (outcome 3) and its utility for peace (outcome 4), set equal, and solve for its 
costs of war.
RUtilityWar￿p_, cr_, t_￿ :￿ 1 ￿ pt ￿ cr
RUtilityPeace￿p_￿ :￿ 1 ￿ p
Simplify￿Solve￿RUtilityWar￿p, cr, t￿ ￿￿ RUtilityPeace￿p￿, cr￿￿￿￿cr ￿ p ￿ pt￿￿
RWarCrLt￿p_, t_￿ :￿ p ￿ pt
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R will fight whenever c R is less than this value.
*Note R’s of the weak type strictly prefer peace (outcome 8), see below.
Simplify￿1 ￿ p ￿ cr ￿ 1 ￿ p￿
cr ￿ 0
What are A’s critical conditions for defection?
Specify A’s utility for defection and ~defection. If A ~defect, the powerful R will war and the weak R will 
~war. Set utility for defection and ~defection equal and solve for critical costs of war and offer from R. 
AUtilityMaintain￿∆_, Α_, ￿_, ca_￿ :￿ ￿ ￿ ￿∆ ￿ Α ￿ ∆ ￿ ca￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿∆ ￿ Α￿
AUtilityDefect￿p_, ∆_, ￿_, pie_, t_￿ :￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ p^t ￿ ∆￿ ￿ ￿pie￿￿
Simplify￿Solve￿AUtilityDefect￿p, ∆, ￿, pie, t￿ ￿ AUtilityMaintain￿∆, Α, ￿, ca￿, ca￿￿
Simplify￿Solve￿AUtilityDefect￿p, ∆, ￿, pie, t￿ ￿ AUtilityMaintain￿∆, Α, ￿, ca￿, pie￿￿￿￿ca ￿ Α ∆ ￿ pie ￿￿1 ￿ pt ￿ ∆￿ ￿
∆ ￿
￿￿
￿￿pie ￿ ∆ ￿Α ￿ ca ￿￿￿1 ￿ pt ￿ ∆￿ ￿ ￿￿
CaStar￿p_, ∆_, Α_, ￿_, pie_, t_￿ :￿ Α ∆ ￿ pie ￿￿1 ￿ pt ￿ ∆￿ ￿
∆ ￿
AMinPie￿p_, ∆_, Α_, ￿_, ca_, t_￿ :￿ ∆ ￿Α ￿ ca ￿￿￿1 ￿ pt ￿ ∆￿ ￿
AMinPie represents minimum offer (Π) A will accept to defect. Assume cA
￿  is uniformly distributed 
between 0 and 1. Therefore, the probability of ~defect = cA
￿ , probability of defect = 1 - cA
￿ .
When does D prefer to launch preventive war?
D’s expected utility for ~war dependent on both probability that R is of the powerful type (￿) and 
probability that A will defect (1 - cA
￿). Setting its utility for war equal to its utility for ~war and solving for 
￿ gives lowest ￿ for which D will war. Solving for Π gives maximum offer for which D will war.
DUtilityWait￿p_, ∆_, Α_, ￿_, cd_, t_, castar_￿ :￿
￿ ￿ ￿castar ￿ ￿p^t ￿ ∆ ￿ ￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ cd￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ castar￿ ￿ ￿p^t￿￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿castar ￿ ￿p ￿ ∆ ￿ ￿1 ￿ Α￿￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ castar￿ ￿ ￿p ￿ ∆ ￿ ￿1 ￿ Α￿￿￿
DUtilityWar￿p_, ∆_, Α_, cd_￿ :￿ p ￿ ∆ ￿ ￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ cd
Simplify￿Solve￿DUtilityWait￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t, CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, pie, t￿￿ ￿￿
DUtilityWar￿p, ∆, Α, cd￿, ￿￿￿
Simplify￿Solve￿DUtilityWait￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t, CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, pie, t￿￿ ￿￿
DUtilityWar￿p, ∆, Α, cd￿, pie￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ∆ ￿cd ￿ Α ∆￿￿ ￿￿cd pie ￿1 ￿ pt ￿ ∆￿ ￿ ∆ ￿￿p ￿ pt ￿1 ￿ pie ￿ pie Α￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿pie ￿ ∆ ￿ pie ∆￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿pie ￿ ∆ ￿cd ￿ cd Α ￿ Α2 ∆ ￿ ￿￿p ￿ pt ￿ ∆￿ ￿ ￿ Α ∆ ￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿ pt ￿ ∆￿ ￿cd ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ∆￿ ￿ ￿￿
2     Solution v7 (for display).nb
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DCriticalOmega￿p_, ∆_, Α_, pie_, cd_, t_￿ :￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ∆ ￿cd ￿ Α ∆￿￿ ￿￿cd pie ￿1 ￿ pt ￿ ∆￿ ￿ ∆ ￿￿p ￿ pt ￿1 ￿ pie ￿ pie Α￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿pie ￿ ∆ ￿ pie ∆￿￿￿
DCriticalPie￿p_, ∆_, Α_, ￿_, cd_, t_￿ :￿ ∆ ￿cd ￿ cd Α ￿ Α2 ∆ ￿ ￿￿p ￿ pt ￿ ∆￿ ￿ ￿ Α ∆ ￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿ pt ￿ ∆￿ ￿cd ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ∆￿ ￿
For all ￿ greater than this value, D will launch preventive war, for all ￿ less than this value, it will wait. 
For all Π less than this value, D will launch preventive war, for all Π greater than this value, D will wait.
Given this expected behavior from D, what is R’s optimal offer to A?
First, what is R’s utility maximizing offer when D does not prefer to launch preventive war? Substitute 
value for cA
￿ in to R’s expected utility if D ~war and differentiate with respect to Π, then set this 
expression equal to 0 and solve for pie to maximize utility.
RPayoffDWait￿p_, ∆_, pie_, cr_, t_, castar_￿ :￿
castar ￿ ￿1 ￿ p^t ￿ cr￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ castar￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ p^t ￿ ∆￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ pie￿￿
RPayoffDWar￿p_, cr_￿ :￿ 1 ￿ p ￿ cr
Simplify￿
Solve￿D￿RPayoffDWait￿p, ∆, pie, cr, t, CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, pie, t￿￿, pie￿ ￿ 0, pie￿￿￿￿pie ￿ Α ∆ ￿ cr ￿
2 ￿ ￿ 2 pt ￿ ￿ 2 ∆ ￿
￿￿
ROffer1￿p_, ∆_, Α_, ￿_, cr_, t_￿ :￿ Α ∆ ￿ cr ￿
2 ￿ ￿ 2 pt ￿ ￿ 2 ∆ ￿
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If this offer causes D to prefer preventive war, however, R may prefer to offer critical pie instead 
(minimum offer that will prevent such a war).
When ROffer1<DCriticalPie (D will war), when does R prefer to offer DCriticalPie?
Set its payoffs for preventive war and ~war equal, and substitute CaStar and DCriticalPie, then solve for 
￿.
Simplify￿Solve￿RPayoffDWait￿p, ∆, DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿, cr, t,
CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿, t￿￿ ￿￿ RPayoffDWar￿p, cr￿, ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿cd2 ￿cr ￿ Α ∆￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ∆ ￿￿p Α ∆ ￿ pt Α ∆ ￿￿￿￿p ￿ pt￿2 Α2 ∆2 ￿ 2 cd ￿￿p ￿ pt￿ Α ∆ ￿cr ￿ Α ∆￿ ￿
cd2 ￿cr2 ￿ 2 cr ￿￿2 ￿ Α￿ ∆ ￿ ∆ ￿￿4 p ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ 4 pt ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ ￿￿2 ￿ Α￿2 ∆￿￿￿￿ ￿
cd ￿2 p ∆ ￿ 2 pt ∆ ￿ p Α ∆ ￿ pt Α ∆ ￿ 2 ∆2 ￿ Α ∆2 ￿ Α2 ∆2 ￿ cr ￿∆ ￿ Α ∆￿ ￿￿￿￿p ￿ pt￿2 Α2 ∆2 ￿ 2 cd ￿￿p ￿ pt￿ Α ∆ ￿cr ￿ Α ∆￿ ￿
cd2 ￿cr2 ￿ 2 cr ￿￿2 ￿ Α￿ ∆ ￿ ∆ ￿￿4 p ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ 4 pt ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ ￿￿2 ￿ Α￿2 ∆￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿2 ￿cd2 ￿￿cr ￿ p ￿ pt ￿ ∆￿ ￿ ￿￿p ￿ pt￿ ∆ ￿￿p ￿ pt ￿ cr ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ Α2￿ ∆￿ ￿
cd ￿2 ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿￿p ￿ pt ￿ ∆￿ ∆ ￿ cr ￿￿p ￿ pt ￿ ∆ ￿ Α ∆￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿ ￿
￿￿cd2 ￿cr ￿ Α ∆￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ∆ ￿p Α ∆ ￿ pt Α ∆ ￿￿￿￿p ￿ pt￿2 Α2 ∆2 ￿ 2 cd ￿￿p ￿ pt￿ Α ∆ ￿cr ￿ Α ∆￿ ￿
cd2 ￿cr2 ￿ 2 cr ￿￿2 ￿ Α￿ ∆ ￿ ∆ ￿￿4 p ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ 4 pt ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ ￿￿2 ￿ Α￿2 ∆￿￿￿￿ ￿
cd ￿￿2 p ∆ ￿ 2 pt ∆ ￿ cr ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ∆ ￿ p Α ∆ ￿ pt Α ∆ ￿ 2 ∆2 ￿ Α ∆2 ￿ Α2 ∆2 ￿￿￿￿p ￿ pt￿2 Α2 ∆2 ￿ 2 cd ￿￿p ￿ pt￿ Α ∆ ￿cr ￿ Α ∆￿ ￿
cd2 ￿cr2 ￿ 2 cr ￿￿2 ￿ Α￿ ∆ ￿ ∆ ￿￿4 p ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ 4 pt ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ ￿￿2 ￿ Α￿2 ∆￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿2 ￿cd2 ￿￿cr ￿ p ￿ pt ￿ ∆￿ ￿ ￿￿p ￿ pt￿ ∆ ￿￿p ￿ pt ￿ cr ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ Α2￿ ∆￿ ￿
cd ￿2 ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿￿p ￿ pt ￿ ∆￿ ∆ ￿ cr ￿￿p ￿ pt ￿ ∆ ￿ Α ∆￿￿￿￿￿￿
The second root is strictly negative, therefore R will make this offer (DCriticalPie) whenever ￿ is 
greater than the first term.
ROffersDCriticalOGt￿p_, ∆_, Α_, cd_, cr_, t_￿ :￿￿￿cd2 ￿cr ￿ Α ∆￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ∆ ￿￿p Α ∆ ￿ pt Α ∆ ￿￿￿￿p ￿ pt￿2 Α2 ∆2 ￿ 2 cd ￿￿p ￿ pt￿ Α ∆ ￿cr ￿ Α ∆￿ ￿
cd2 ￿cr2 ￿ 2 cr ￿￿2 ￿ Α￿ ∆ ￿ ∆ ￿￿4 p ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ 4 pt ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ ￿￿2 ￿ Α￿2 ∆￿￿￿￿ ￿
cd ￿2 p ∆ ￿ 2 pt ∆ ￿ p Α ∆ ￿ pt Α ∆ ￿ 2 ∆2 ￿ Α ∆2 ￿ Α2 ∆2 ￿ cr ￿∆ ￿ Α ∆￿ ￿￿￿￿p ￿ pt￿2 Α2 ∆2 ￿ 2 cd ￿￿p ￿ pt￿ Α ∆ ￿cr ￿ Α ∆￿ ￿
cd2 ￿cr2 ￿ 2 cr ￿￿2 ￿ Α￿ ∆ ￿ ∆ ￿￿4 p ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ 4 pt ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ ￿￿2 ￿ Α￿2 ∆￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿2 ￿cd2 ￿￿cr ￿ p ￿ pt ￿ ∆￿ ￿ ￿￿p ￿ pt￿ ∆ ￿￿p ￿ pt ￿ cr ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ Α2￿ ∆￿ ￿
cd ￿2 ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿￿p ￿ pt ￿ ∆￿ ∆ ￿ cr ￿￿p ￿ pt ￿ ∆ ￿ Α ∆￿￿￿￿
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*Note that this behavior occurs in a narrow set of circumstances. Offering DCriticalPie often causes cA
￿  
to fall below 0, meaning that the set of conditions derived here no longer applies.
How do these offers revise D’s critical Omega?
Repeat calculations for D given above and substitute the utility-maximizing offer dervied for R.
DUtilityWait￿p_, ∆_, Α_, ￿_, cd_, t_, castar_￿ :￿
￿ ￿ ￿castar ￿ ￿p^t ￿ ∆ ￿ ￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ cd￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ castar￿ ￿ ￿p^t￿￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿castar ￿ ￿p ￿ ∆ ￿ ￿1 ￿ Α￿￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ castar￿ ￿ ￿p ￿ ∆ ￿ ￿1 ￿ Α￿￿￿
DUtilityWar￿p_, ∆_, Α_, cd_￿ :￿ p ￿ ∆ ￿ ￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ cd
Simplify￿Solve￿DUtilityWait￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t,
CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿, t￿￿ ￿￿ DUtilityWar￿p, ∆, Α, cd￿, ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ∆ ￿cd ￿￿2 ￿ Α￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ Α ∆￿
cd cr ￿ ∆ ￿cr ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ 2 ￿￿p ￿ pt ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ∆￿￿ ￿￿
DCriticalOmegaROffer1￿p_, ∆_, Α_, cd_, cr_, t_￿ :￿
∆ ￿cd ￿￿2 ￿ Α￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ Α ∆￿
cd cr ￿ ∆ ￿cr ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ 2 ￿￿p ￿ pt ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ∆￿￿
For all ￿ greater than this value D will war. If R offers DCriticalPie D is by definition indifferent between 
war and ~war.
Other restrictions on endogenous terms
R’s offer must be between 0 and 1.
0 ￿ ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿ ￿ 1
0 ￿
Α ∆ ￿ cr ￿
2 ￿ ￿ 2 pt ￿ ￿ 2 ∆ ￿
￿ 1
0 ￿ DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿ ￿ 1
0 ￿
∆ ￿cd ￿ cd Α ￿ Α2 ∆ ￿ ￿￿p ￿ pt ￿ ∆￿ ￿ ￿ Α ∆ ￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿ pt ￿ ∆￿ ￿cd ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ Α￿ ∆￿ ￿ ￿ 1
Conditions for Each Outcome and Existence 
Demonstrations
Sub Case 1: R offers optimal
Conditions and critical values summarized
R offers utility maximizing offer or 0
Π ￿ ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿
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Π must be between 0 and 1
0 ￿ ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿ ￿ 1
cA
￿  must be between 0 and 1 (sustituting Π in cA
￿)
0 ￿ CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿, t￿ ￿ 1
R must prefer war in final move
cr ￿ RWarCrLt￿p, t￿
A indifferent when AminPie equals ROffer
ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿ ￿ AMinPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ca, t￿
D indifferent when ￿ equals DCriticalOmega (substituting ROffer)
￿ ￿ DCriticalOmegaROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, cd, cr, t￿
Conditions and Existence Demonstration for Outcome 1: Preventive 
War
Test parameters
p ￿ .8
∆ ￿ .3
Α ￿ .75
￿ ￿ .9
cd ￿ .2
cr ￿ .2
ca ￿ .25
t ￿ 2.5
R offers 0
Π ￿ 0
cA
￿  must be between 0 and 1 (sustituting Π in cA
￿)
0 ￿ CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, 0, t￿ ￿ 1
True
R must prefer war in final move
cr ￿ RWarCrLt￿p, t￿
True
￿ exceeds critical ￿
￿ ￿ DCriticalOmegaROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, cd, cr, t￿
True
Conditions and Existence Demonstration for Outcome 2: Defection 
and Peaceful Transition
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Conditions and Existence Demonstration for Outcome 2: Defection 
and Peaceful Transition
Test Parameters
p ￿ .8
∆ ￿ .2
Α ￿ .75
￿ ￿ .65
cd ￿ .2
cr ￿ .2
ca ￿ .25
t ￿ 2.5
R offers utility maximizing offer
Π ￿ ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿
Π must be between 0 and 1
0 ￿ ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿ ￿ 1
True
cA
￿  must be between 0 and 1 (sustituting Π in cA
￿)
0 ￿ CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿, t￿ ￿ 1
True
R must prefer war in final move
cr ￿ RWarCrLt￿p, t￿
True
ROffer exceeds Amin (sustituting Π in Amin), A will defect.
ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿ ￿ AMinPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ca, t￿
True
D ~war, ￿ less than than critical ￿
￿ ￿ DCriticalOmegaROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, cd, cr, t￿
True
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Conditions and Existence Demonstration for Outcome 3: ~Defection 
and R War
Test Parameters
p ￿ .8
∆ ￿ .4
Α ￿ .75
￿ ￿ .5
cd ￿ .2
cr ￿ .2
ca ￿ .25
t ￿ 2.5
R offers utility maximizing offer
Π ￿ ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿
Π must be between 0 and 1
0 ￿ ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿ ￿ 1
True
cA
￿  must be between 0 and 1 (sustituting Π in cA
￿)
0 ￿ CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿, t￿ ￿ 1
True
R must prefer war in final move
cr ￿ RWarCrLt￿p, t￿
True
ROffer is less than Amin (substituting Π in Amin)
ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿ ￿ AMinPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ca, t￿
True
￿ less than critical ￿
￿ ￿ DCriticalOmegaROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, cd, cr, t￿
True
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Sub Case 2: R offers Dcritical
Conditions and critical values summarized
R offers DCriticalPie
Π ￿ DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿
Π must be between 0 and 1
0 ￿ DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿ ￿ 1
cA
￿  must be between 0 and 1 (substituting DCriticalPie)
0 ￿ CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿, t￿ ￿ 1
R must prefer war in final move
cr ￿ RWarCrLt￿p, t￿
A indifferent when AminPie equals Π
DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿ ￿ AMinPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ca, t￿
By definition, DCritical offer from R makes D indifferent between war and ~war. Therefore, these 
conditions never produce Outcome 1 (Preventive War).
Offering ROffer1 must make D prefer war (hence the alternative offer to avoid war)
ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿ ￿ DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿
R must also find it optimal to make this offer
￿ ￿ ROffersDCriticalOGt￿p, ∆, Α, cd, cr, t￿
Conditions and Existence Demonstration for Outcome 2: Defection 
and Peaceful Transition
Test Parameters
p ￿ .8
∆ ￿ .2
Α ￿ .75
￿ ￿ .71
cd ￿ .2
cr ￿ .2
ca ￿ .25
t ￿ 2.5
R offers DCritical
Π ￿ DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿
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Π must be between 0 and 1
0 ￿ DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿ ￿ 1
True
cA
￿  must be between 0 and 1 (sustituting DCriticalPie)
0 ￿ CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿, t￿ ￿ 1
True
R must prefer war in final move
cr ￿ RWarCrLt￿p, t￿
True
ROffer exceeds Amin (substituting Π in Amin)
DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿ ￿ AMinPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ca, t￿
True
Offering ROffer1 must make D prefer war
ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿ ￿ DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿
True
R must also find it optimal to make this offer
￿ ￿ ROffersDCriticalOGt￿p, ∆, Α, cd, cr, t￿
True
Conditions and Existence Demonstration for Outcome 3: ~Defection 
and R War
Test Parameters
p ￿ .6
∆ ￿ .0666667
Α ￿ .25
￿ ￿ .1347181582090478
cd ￿ .05
cr ￿ .05
ca ￿ .05
t ￿ 2.5
R offers DCritical
Π ￿ DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿
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Π must be between 0 and 1
0 ￿ DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿ ￿ 1
True
cA
￿  must be between 0 and 1 (sustituting DCriticalPie)
0 ￿ CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿, t￿ ￿ 1
True
R must prefer war in final move
cr ￿ RWarCrLt￿p, t￿
True
ROffer is less than Amin (substituting Π in Amin)
DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿ ￿ AMinPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ca, t￿
True
Offering ROffer1 must make D prefer war
ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿ ￿ DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿
True
R must also find it optimal to make this offer
￿ ￿ ROffersDCriticalOGt￿p, ∆, Α, cd, cr, t￿
True
Case 2 (cA
￿ ￿ 1)
Derivation of Conditions
First, R must prefer war in final move
Specify R’s utility for war (outcome 3) and its utility for peace (outcome 4), set equal, and solve for its 
costs of war.
RUtilityWar￿p_, cr_, t_￿ :￿ 1 ￿ pt ￿ cr
RUtilityPeace￿p_￿ :￿ 1 ￿ p
Simplify￿Solve￿RUtilityWar￿p, cr, t￿ ￿￿ RUtilityPeace￿p￿, cr￿￿￿￿cr ￿ p ￿ pt￿￿
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RWarCrLt￿p_, t_￿ :￿ p ￿ pt
R will fight whenever c R is less than this value.
Because cA
￿  = 1, we know that A will not defect.
Therefore, there is no Π that will cause defection, so R offers 0.
Given these behaviors, what is D’s critical value for war?
In this case, D’s expected utility based on only uncertainity about R’s type, it knows that A will not 
defect. Set expected utility for ~war equal to utility for war and solve for ￿.
DUtilityWait2￿p_, ∆_, Α_, ￿_, cd_, t_￿ :￿
￿ ￿ ￿p^t ￿ ∆ ￿ ￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ cd￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿p ￿ ∆ ￿ ￿1 ￿ Α￿￿
DUtilityWar2￿p_, ∆_, Α_, cd_￿ :￿ p ￿ ∆ ￿ ￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ cd
Simplify￿Solve￿DUtilityWait2￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿ ￿￿ DUtilityWar2￿p, ∆, Α, cd￿, ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ cd
cd ￿ p ￿ pt
￿￿
DCriticalOmega2￿p_, t_, cd_￿ :￿ cd
cd ￿ p ￿ pt
D will initiate preventive war whenever ￿ is greater than this value.
Conditions for Each Outcome and Existence 
Demonstrations
Conditions and critical values summarized
R Offers 0
Π ￿ 0
cA
￿  must be greater than 1
CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, 0, t￿ ￿ 1
R must prefer war in final move
cr ￿ RWarCrLt￿p, t￿
D indifferent between war and ~war when
￿ ￿ DCriticalOmega2￿p, t, cd￿
Conditions that produce Outcome 2 (Defection and Peaceful Transition) strictly ruled out under these 
restrictions.
Conditions and Existence Demonstration for Outcome 1: Preventive 
War
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Conditions and Existence Demonstration for Outcome 1: Preventive 
War
Test parameters
p ￿ .8
∆ ￿ .5
Α ￿ .75
￿ ￿ .6
cd ￿ .2
cr ￿ .2
ca ￿ .25
t ￿ 2.5
R Offers 0
Π ￿ 0
cA
￿  must be greater than 1
CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, 0, t￿ ￿ 1
True
R must prefer war in final move
cr ￿ RWarCrLt￿p, t￿
True
D prefers war
￿ ￿ DCriticalOmega2￿p, t, cd￿
True
Conditions and Existence Demonstration for Outcome 3: ~Defection 
and R War
Test parameters
p ￿ .8
∆ ￿ .3
Α ￿ .75
￿ ￿ .25
cd ￿ .2
cr ￿ .2
ca ￿ .25
t ￿ 2.5
R Offers 0
Π ￿ 0
cA
￿  must be greater than 1
CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, 0, t￿ ￿ 1
True
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R must prefer war in final move
cr ￿ RWarCrLt￿p, t￿
True
D prefers ~war
￿ ￿ DCriticalOmega2￿p, t, cd￿
True
Case 3 (cA
￿ < 0)
Derivation of Conditions
First, R must prefer war in final move
Specify R’s utility for war (outcome 3) and its utility for peace (outcome 4), set equal, and solve for its 
costs of war.
RUtilityWar￿p_, cr_, t_￿ :￿ 1 ￿ pt ￿ cr
RUtilityPeace￿p_￿ :￿ 1 ￿ p
Simplify￿Solve￿RUtilityWar￿p, cr, t￿ ￿￿ RUtilityPeace￿p￿, cr￿￿￿￿cr ￿ p ￿ pt￿￿
RWarCrLt￿p_, t_￿ :￿ p ￿ pt
R will fight whenever c R is less than this value.
In this case, we know that A will always defect (cA
￿  = 0).
R will make minimum offer that will produce defection
What value of Π will make cA
￿  = 0?
Simplify￿Solve￿CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, pie, t￿ ￿ 0, pie￿￿￿￿pie ￿ Α ∆
￿ ￿ pt ￿ ￿ ∆ ￿
￿￿
ROffer3￿p_, ∆_, Α_, ￿_, t_￿ :￿ Α ∆
￿ ￿ pt ￿ ￿ ∆ ￿
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R will make this offer so long as D does not prefer war, then offer 0.
What is D’s Critical ￿?
Set payoffs for war and expected utility for ~war equal and solve for ￿.
DUtilityWait3￿p_, ∆_, Α_, ￿_, t_￿ :￿ ￿ ￿ ￿p^t￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿p ￿ ∆ ￿ ￿1 ￿ Α￿￿
DUtilityWar3￿p_, ∆_, Α_, cd_￿ :￿ p ￿ ∆ ￿ ￿1 ￿ Α￿ ￿ cd
Simplify￿Solve￿DUtilityWait3￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, t￿ ￿￿ DUtilityWar3￿p, ∆, Α, cd￿, ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ cd
p ￿ pt ￿ ∆ ￿ Α ∆
￿￿
DCriticalOmega3￿p_, ∆_, Α_, cd_, t_￿ :￿ cd
p ￿ pt ￿ ∆ ￿ Α ∆
D will initiate preventive war whenever ￿ is greater than this value.
Conditions for Each Outcome and Existence 
Demonstrations
Conditions and critical values summarized
R Offers minimum to produce defection or 0
Π ￿ ROffer3￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, t￿
cA
￿  must be less or equal to 0
CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ROffer3￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, t￿, t￿ ￿ 0
R must prefer war in final move
cr ￿ RWarCrLt￿p, t￿
D indifferent between war and ~war when
￿ ￿ DCriticalOmega3￿p, ∆, Α, cd, t￿
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Conditions and Existence Demonstration for Outcome 1: Preventive 
War
Test parameters
p ￿ .8
∆ ￿ .5
Α ￿ 0
￿ ￿ .8
cd ￿ .2
cr ￿ .2
ca ￿ .25
t ￿ 2.5
R Offers 0
Π ￿ 0
cA
￿  must be less or equal to 0
CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, 0, t￿ ￿ 0
True
R must prefer war in final move
cr ￿ RWarCrLt￿p, t￿
True
D prefers war
￿ ￿ DCriticalOmega3￿p, ∆, Α, cd, t￿
True
Conditions and Existence Demonstration for Outcome 2: Defection 
and Peaceful Transition
Test parameters
p ￿ .8
∆ ￿ .1
Α ￿ .75
￿ ￿ .75
cd ￿ .2
cr ￿ .2
ca ￿ .25
t ￿ 2.5
R Offers minimum to produce defection
Π ￿ ROffer3￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, t￿
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cA
￿  must be less or equal to 0
CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ROffer3￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, t￿, t￿ ￿ 0
True
R must prefer war in final move
cr ￿ RWarCrLt￿p, t￿
True
D prefers ~war
￿ ￿ DCriticalOmega3￿p, ∆, Α, cd, t￿
True
Derivation of Piecewise Functions
R’s Offer
Global Restrictions
Π must be between 0 and 1 (inclusive)
0 ￿ ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿ ￿ 1
0 ￿ DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿ ￿ 1
ROffer2 ￿ 0
0 ￿ ROffer3￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, t￿ ￿ 1
If prescribed Π is less than DCritical Pie, offer 0 (offer 0 when D will war)
Π ￿ DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿
Otherwise
Π ￿ 0
Conditionals
When
0 ￿ CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿, t￿ ￿ 1
And
0 ￿ ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿ ￿ 1
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And
ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿ ￿ DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿
Then
Π ￿ ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿
When
0 ￿ CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿, t￿ ￿ 1
And
0 ￿ DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿ ￿ 1
And
￿ ￿ ROffersDCriticalOGt￿p, ∆, Α, cd, cr, t￿
And
ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿ ￿ DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿
Then
Π ￿ DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿
When
CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿, t￿ ￿ 1
Then
Π ￿ 0
When
CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿, t￿ ￿ 0
And
0 ￿ ROffer3￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, t￿ ￿ 1
And
￿ ￿ DCriticalOmega3￿p, ∆, Α, cd, t￿
Then
Π ￿ ROffer3￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, t￿
Otherwise
Π ￿ 0
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Function
ROffer￿p_, ∆_, Α_, ￿_, cd_, cr_, t_￿ :￿ Piecewise￿￿￿ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿, 0 ￿ CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿, t￿ ￿ 1 &&
0 ￿ ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿ ￿ 1 && ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿ ￿
DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿￿, ￿DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿,
0 ￿ CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿, t￿ ￿ 1 &&
0 ￿ DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿ ￿ 1 &&
￿ ￿ ROffersDCriticalOGt￿p, ∆, Α, cd, cr, t￿ &&
ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿ ￿ DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿￿,￿ROffer3￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, t￿, CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ROffer1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cr, t￿, t￿ ￿ 0 &&
0 ￿ ROffer3￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, t￿ ￿ 1 && ￿ ￿ DCriticalOmega3￿p, ∆, Α, cd, t￿￿￿, 0￿
D’s Preventive War Decision
Conditionals
When
0 ￿ CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ROffer￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, cr, t￿, t￿ ￿ 1
Then war when the following is positive
DWar1￿p_, ∆_, Α_, ￿_, cd_, cr_, t_￿ :￿
DCriticalPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿ ￿ ROffer￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, cr, t￿
When
CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ROffer￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, cr, t￿, t￿ ￿ 1
Then war when the following is positive
DWar2￿p_, ￿_, cd_, t_￿ :￿ ￿ ￿ DCriticalOmega2￿p, t, cd￿
When
CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ROffer￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, cr, t￿, t￿ ￿ 0
Then war when the following is positive
DWar3￿p_, ∆_, Α_, ￿_, cd_, t_￿ :￿ ￿ ￿ DCriticalOmega3￿p, ∆, Α, cd, t￿
Function
DWar￿p_, ∆_, Α_, ￿_, cd_, cr_, t_￿ :￿ Piecewise￿￿￿DWar1￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, cr, t￿,
.001 ￿ CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ROffer￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, cr, t￿, t￿ ￿ .999￿,￿DWar2￿p, ￿, cd, t￿, CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ROffer￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, cr, t￿, t￿ ￿ 1￿,￿DWar3￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, t￿, CaStar￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ROffer￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, cr, t￿, t￿ ￿ 0￿￿￿
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When Will A Defect?
Whenever ROffer exceeds AMinPie (when this function takes on positive values)
ADefects￿p_, ∆_, Α_, ￿_, cd_, cr_, ca_, t_￿ :￿
ROffer￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, cd, cr, t￿ ￿ AMinPie￿p, ∆, Α, ￿, ca, t￿
Comparative Statics
Parameters
p ￿ .8
∆ ￿ .3 ￿or variable￿
Α ￿ .75
￿ ￿ .5 ￿or variable￿
cd ￿ .2
cr ￿ .2
ca ￿ .25 ￿or variable￿
t ￿ 2.5
A’s Behavior
Minimum offer for defection as a function of resolve (cA)
Plot￿AMinPie￿.8, .3, .75, .5, ca, 2.5￿, ￿ca, .001, .8￿,
PlotRange ￿ ￿.001, 1￿, PlotStyle ￿ Orange, AxesLabel ￿ ￿ca, Π￿￿
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
ca
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Π
Minimum offer for defection as a function of belief about R (￿) and A 
size/strategic value (∆)
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Minimum offer for defection as a function of belief about R (￿) and A 
size/strategic value (∆)
AminPieOd ￿ Plot3D￿AMinPie￿.8, ∆, .75, ￿, .25, 2.5￿, ￿∆, 0, .8￿,￿￿, 0, 1￿, PlotRange ￿ ￿.001, 1￿, PlotStyle ￿ Yellow, AxesLabel ￿ ￿∆, ￿￿￿
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
∆
0.0
0.5
1.0
￿
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
R’s Offer
ROfferOd2 ￿ Plot3D￿ROffer￿.8, ∆, .75, ￿, .2, .2, 2.5￿, ￿∆, 0, .8￿,￿￿, 0, 1￿, PlotRange ￿ ￿.001, 1￿, PlotStyle ￿ Red, AxesLabel ￿ ￿∆, ￿￿￿
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
∆
0.0
0.5
1.0
￿
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
D’s War Decision
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D’s War Decision
DWarOd ￿ Plot3D￿DWar￿.8, ∆, .75, ￿, .2, .2, 2.5￿, ￿∆, 0, .8￿,￿￿, 0, 1￿, PlotRange ￿ ￿.001, 1￿, PlotStyle ￿ Orange, AxesLabel ￿ ￿∆, ￿￿￿
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
∆
0.0
0.5
1.0
￿
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
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When will A Defect?
ADefectOd ￿ Plot3D￿ADefects￿.8, ∆, .75, ￿, .2, .2, .2, 2.5￿, ￿∆, 0, .8￿,￿￿, 0, 1￿, PlotRange ￿ ￿.001, 1￿, PlotStyle ￿ Green, AxesLabel ￿ ￿∆, ￿￿￿
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
∆
0.0
0.5
1.0
￿
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
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